Important Announcements Made, Handouts Handed Out, Other Notes

• Syllabus
• What Is the Philosophy of Religion?

• PR, Rowe, Intro to Part I, pp. 2-5
• Back of Syllabus
• Skim PR, Findlay, pp. 19-23

•  see syllabus

• The Nature of God
• The Need for A Definition
• A First Stab at Some Divine Attributes

• office hours canceled today
• handed out Handout 1 - The Nature of God

• God as a Person
• God and Gender
• A Conception of God: God as the Supreme Being
• What Perfections Are
• Essentiality vs. Accidence
• Why God Should Have the Perfections Essentially

• Aquinas, "The Omnipotence of God," PR, pp. 59-61.
• Clarke, "Can God Do Evil," PR, pp. 62-63.

• Omniscience
• Moral Perfection
• Necessary Existence
• Essential Eternality
• Other Possible Divine Attributes
• A Definition of 'God'
• The Problem of Omnipotence

•  Re-read the Aquinas and Clarke.
  For Aquinas: (i) try to identify the two accounts of omnipotence he rejects, and try to figure out why he rejects them; (ii) try to identify his own account of omnipotence.
  For Clarke: (i) try to figure out why he would think Aquinas's account of omnipotence is unacceptable; (ii) try to identify his own account of omnipotence

• Handed Out Handout 2 - Omnipotence.

• The Absolute Account of Omnipotence
• An Argument Against the Absolute Account of Omnipotence
• The Significance of the Conclusion of the Argument Against the Absolute Account of Omnipotence
• Explaining Arguments; Giving Rationales for Premises
• The Possibility Account of Omnipotence
• Two kinds of possibility: relative possibility vs. absolute (“metaphysical”) possibility
• The Relative Possibility Account of Omnipotence
• An Argument Against the Relative Possibility Account of Omnipotence

• Wielenberg, "Omnipotence Again," on Readings page of website. YOU CAN SKIP SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF THIS PAPER (but do glance through them, to get a flavor for how complicated analyses of omnipotence can get).

• No class next Friday.
• Our final exam is Tuesday, December 19th, 10:30am – 1:00pm. (I assume it's in our usual meeting place.)

• The Thomistic (or Metaphysical Possibility) Account of Omnipotence
• The Thomistic Account at Work: Divine Suicide, The Paradox of the Stone

•  we did an individual exercise on Divine Suicide and a group exercise on the Paradox of the Stone

• More Paradox of the Stone
• An Argument Against The Thomistic Account of Omnipotence: Divine Wrongdoing
• Responding to the Divine Wrongdoing Argument by Denying that God is Essentially Morally Perfect
• An Independent Rationale for Thinking That While God is Morally Perfect, He is Not Essentially Morally Perfect
• Clarke's Account of Omnipotence

• Clarke's Account of Omnipotence
• An Argument Against Clarke’s Account of Omnipotence: The Case of Mr. McEar
• Wielenberg’s Account
• Wielenberg’s Account at Work

• Excerpt from Plato's Euthyphro (on Readings page on website)

• posted Logic and Truth handout (Handout 0) on Handouts page, for those without this background.
• Exam #1 will take place on Friday 9/29. More on this later.

• The Divine Command Theory (a.k.a. Theological Voluntarism)
• Motivations for DCT
• DCT and Atheism
• Two Inconclusive Arguments Against DCT

• Re-read Plato's Euthyphro

• Handed Out Handout 3 - God and Morality

• The Euthyphro Problem
• Socrates' Question
• Horn 1 vs. Horn 2
• Three Implausible Consequences of Horn 1:
  (a) arbitrariness
  (b) contingency [Bundy example]

• READ Passages from God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist, by WIlliam Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, on Readings page of website.
  (As you read, try to identify Craig's reasons for holding the first premise of his argument. Think about whether you think they are any good.)

• Three Implausible Consequences of Horn 1:
  (a) arbitrariness
  (b) contingency [Bundy example]
  (c) triviality
• Horn's 2 Incompatibility with DCT
• The Euthyphro Problem in the form of a valid line-by-line argument
• Does Horn 2 Make God Less Powerful, Or in Any Other Way Less Great?

• Review for Exam #1

• Exam 1

• Partial Intro to the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
• Group Exercise on Augustine Reading: What is the Augustinian Version of the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge?

• READ Augustine, excerpt from On Free Choice of the Will.
  Try to figure out Augustine's solution to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge.
• READ Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," pp. 44-58 in PR.

• Handed out Augustine excerpt from On Free Choice of the Will.
• Sorry I was unable to post this Augustine reading last Friday, as I said I would.

• The Problem with the Augustinian Version of the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
• The Necessity of the Consequent vs. the Necessity of the Consequence (Aquinas passage)
• Two Interpretations of the Augustinian Argument
• The Logical Form of the Interpretations
• Proving Invalidity
• Augustine's Reply to His Version of the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge

• Handed out Aquinas excerpt (from Summa Contra Gentiles)

• Returned Bluebooks; discuss Exam #1
• The Principle that Knowledge Entails Truth
• The Principle of Divine Foreknowledge of Action
• Four Assumptions of Divine Foreknowledge of Action: (i) God is omniscient; (ii) God is everlasting (i.e., there is no time at which God does not exist); (iii) there are true propositions about the future about what actions people will perform; and (iv) God exists in time (and so it is correct to say that God knows things at times).

• READ Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," only pp. 235-237 for now. (This is to solidify our grasp of the problem with the Augustinian Version of the Dilemma.)

• Handed out Handout 4: The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge

• The Fixity of the Past
• Transfer of Powerlessness
• Freedom Requires the Ability to Do Otherwise
• Compatibilism (about Freedom and Determinism)
• Determinism
• A Simplistic Compatibilistic Theory of Freedom
• Why the Simplistic Compatibilistic Theory of Freedom Is Implausible (the Brain-Controlling Aliens)
• The Main Argument

• READ Boethius, reading from PR, pp. 24-32 -- focus on "Prose VI," pp. 29-32.
• Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," up to p. 240.
  (Plantinga argues in this section that "the claim that God is outside of time is essentially irrelevant" to the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. Figure out what his argument is. Is it any good?)

• Review of The Main Argument
• The Boethian Response
• Logical Fatalism
• The Aristotelian Response: future contingents lack truth value.
• Problem for the Aristotelian Response: Special Relativity and the Lack of Absolute Simultaneity

• READ: Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," thru Sec. 4 (up to p. 258).

• The Boethian Response
• The Dilemma of Freedom and Atemporal Knowledge
• The Principle of the Fixity of the Eternal
• The Ockhamist Response
• Hard Facts vs. Soft Facts

• READ: Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," the rest of it.
• READ: Handout 5 - Logical Fatalism

• The Ockhamist Response
• Hard Facts vs. Soft Facts
• Quitting Smoking Example
• Accidental Necessity
• Ockham's Rejection of the Fixity of the Past
• The Incompatibilist's Rejoinder to Ockham: The Fixity of the Hard Past, and the claim that the fact that God knows in 1000 A.D. what I will do at noon today is a hard fact about 1000 A.D.
• Ockham's Reply to the Rejoinder: the fact that God knows in 1000 A.D. what I will do at noon today is actually a soft fact about 1000 A.D.
• The Justification for This
• The Incompatibilist's Second Rejoinder to Ockham: The Dilemma of Freedom and Forebelief
• The Principle that Infallible Belief Entails Truth
• The Principle of Divine Forebelief of Action
• The the claim that the fact that God believes in 1000 A.D. what I will do at noon today is a hard fact about 1000 A.D.

• READ: Pascal, pp. 444-446 in PR.
• READ: Hacking, pp. 446-455 in PR.
• For Wednesday, we'll start with your questions on the current state of the dialectic (in our class) with respect to the Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.
• BRING YOUR BOOK ON WEDNESDAY

• Dramatic Review of Dialectic
• Key Question: Is the fact that God believes in 1000 A.D. that I will clap at noon today a hard fact or a soft fact about the past?
• The Intuition that this is a soft fact
• Plantinga's Second Argument that this is a hard fact
• The Concept of Logical Equivalence
• Another Key Question: Are there counterexamples -- independent of the debate over freedom and foreknowledge -- to Plantinga's claim that any proposition logically equivalent to a soft fact is itself a soft fact?

• READ: Entry on "Pascal's Wager," by Alan Hájek in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• EXAM #2 will be next Friday, Oct. 27.
  START STUDYING TODAY!!!
  (see Study Guide)
• Bring a bluebook and a blue or black ink pen.
• EXAM #2 is cumulative.
• EXAM #2 will be a short answer, as opposed to an essay, exam.
• Wednesday will be Review Day.
• Here is a preliminary Study Guide for Exam #2 . Check back for updates.

• Pascal's Wager
• Epistemic Obligation vs. Prudential Obligation
• Decision Theory
• The Argument from Dominance
• The Concept of Dominance
• The Principle of Dominance
• Decision Matrices
• The Decision Matrix Associated with the Argument from Dominance
• The Problem with the Argument from Dominance: the Appeals of a Libertine Life

• The Argument from Expected Value
• The Concept of Expected Value
• The Principle of Expected Value
• The Decision Matrix Associated with the Argument from Expected Value
• The Probabilities Associated with the Argument from Expected Value
• The Problem with the Argument from Expected Value
• The Argument from Dominating Expected Value
• The Concept of Dominating Expected Value
• The Principle of Dominating Expected Value
• The Decision Matrix Associated with the Argument from Expected Value
• The Probabilities Associated with the Argument from Dominating Expected Value
• A Problem with the Argument from Argument from Dominating Expected Value: the Many Gods Objection

•  Richard Dawkins' new book, The God Delusion, was reviewed in last Sunday's New York Times.

• Review for Exam #2

• Thursday, 10/26: 6:30 pm, HUMN 1B80:  Philosophy and Film: Brad Monton presents:
  Woody Allen's "Crimes and Misdemeanors," on the topics of love, death, God, punishment, and ophthalmology.

• Exam #2

• READ, Anselm, "The Ontological Argument," pp. 95-97 in PR.
• READ, Descartes, "The Supremely Perfect Being Must Exist," pp. 102-104 in PR.
  (If you want to read ahead, we're going to read every reading on the ontological argument in the book (pp. 95-125).)

• The Ontological Argument
• A priori Arguments
• Anselm's Definition of God
• A Simple (and Sophistical) Ontological Argument
• A Parody Argument
• Existence in Reality vs. Existence in the Understanding

• Gaunilo, "The Perfect Island Objection," pp. 97-98 in PR.
• Anselm, "Reply to Gaunilo," pp. 98-101 in PR.

• A View about how ordinary sentences might be true
• The Problem of Negative Existentials
• An Anselmian Solution to the Problem of Negative Existentials
• Reductio Ad Absurdum Arguments
• Anselm's Argument

• Kant, "On the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof," pp. 104-108 in PR.
• Plantinga, "A Modal Version of the Ontological Argument, " in PR, ONLY UP TO PAGE 115.

• You have the option of either writing a paper (roughly 2000 words) or taking Exam #3. If you write a paper, you must have your topic and thesis approved in advance (and your paper must be defending a thesis, not just explaining the views of others).
• If you decide you want to write a paper, please get in touch with me very soon to have your topic and thesis approved.
• Here is that song Meinongian Babe.

• Returned Exam #2
• Went Over Exam #2 in Detail

• The Great-Making Assumption
• Gaunilo's Objection
• Anselm's Reply
• Plantinga's Reply

• I handed out Handout 7.
• If you decide to write the paper, it is due in class on Monday, Nov. 27.
• The paper should be about 2000 words, give or take.
• It must defend a thesis.
• You must get your topic and thesis approved by me in advance.
• Also, I recommend checking out this guide to writing a paper: http://home.earthlink.net/~owl233/writing.htm.

• Kant's Objection
• What It Is for a Property to Be "Real"
• A Test for Property Reality
• Kant's Argument Against Anselm's Argument
• Kant's Argument for Premise 3

• Paley, "The Evidence of Design," pp. 155-161 in PR.
• Van Inwagen, "The Wider Teleological Argument," pp. pp. 172-183 in PR.

• The Argument from Design
• The Watch Argument
• The Principle of Confirmation Theory
• Paley's Human Eye Argument
• The Problem with Paley's Human Eye Argument
• The Fine-Tuning Argument
• The Fine-Tuning Evidence

• Exam #3 is in one week. The Study Guide for Exam #3 is now up.
• If you don't see me by the beginning of next week to have your paper topic approved, I'll assume you plan to take Exam #3 instead.
• Handed out Handout #8.

• Review of the Fine-Tuning Argument
• The Objection based on the Chance Hypothesis
• The Rocks in the Sand
• An Anthropic Objection
• The Firing Squad
• The Multiple Universes Hypothesis
• The Multiple Coins Hypothesis

• Review for Exam #3

• Exam #3

• The Problem of Evil
• Leibnizian Version of the Problem of Evil
• Intrinsic Value vs. Instrumental Value
• The No-Best-World Reply

READ:

• Leibniz, first section of "The Argument Reduced to Syllogistic Form," pp. 216-217 in PR.
• Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," pp. 242-251 in PR.

OPTIONAL READINGS

• Hume, "God and the Problem of Evil," pp. 224-233 in PR.
• Dostoevsky, "Rebellion," pp. 234-241 in PR.

• Returned Exam #3
• Collected Papers

• Class Party
• Group Discussion of Faith: What Is it?; Is it legitimate to "take something on faith"?

• Five Weak Replies to the Leibnizian Version of the Problem of Evil:
• Skeptical Theism
• Manichaeism
• Evil As a Privation
• Evil As a Counterpart of the Good
• A Divine Command Theoretic Response
• A Stronger Reply: No Best World

READ:

• Hick, "The 'Soul-Making' Theodicy," pp. 251-259 in PR.

• A Second Version of the Problem of Evil
• A Principle About Good Persons
• Counterexamples to A Principle About Good Persons
• A Key Distinction: Causally Necessary vs. Metaphysically Necessary Evils

READ:

• Plantinga, "The Free Will Defense," pp. 259-284 in PR.

• Did FCQ's today

• An Illustration of the Principle About Good Persons (the Disaster at McGuckin Hardware)
• Plantinga's Counterexample to the Principle About Good Persons
• Aesthetic Theodicy
• Lewis' Reply to Aesthetic Theodicy
• Hick's "Soul-Building" Theodicy

READ:

• Wielenberg, excerpt from Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
  (this has a nice summary of Plantinga's and Hick's Theodicies, along with some remarks that relate to the Divine Command Theoretic response to the problem of evil)
• Lewis, "Evil for Freedom's Sake?" (on website)
  (don't worry about technical or other hard-to-understand parts)

Handed out Handout 9 - The Problem of Evil

Consider these issues concerning Plantinga's Free Will Theodicy for Friday:

• Why didn't God create a world in which people are free but in which they never do evil?
• Plantinga's answer is: such a world was inaccessible to God. But how could that be?
• And how could this be compatible with God's omnipotence?

• Plantinga's Free Will Theodicy
• Significant Freedom
• Moral Significance
• Moral Evil
• Mackie's Objection
• Plantinga's Reply
• How Some Worlds Could Be Inaccessible To God
• Counterfactuals of Freedom
• Omnipotence and God's Inability to Actualize Some Worlds

Optional Reading:

• Pereboom, "The Problem of Evil," (read this especially if you want to hear a more detailed discussion of the skeptical theist response)

•  Our final exam is Tuesday, December 19th, 10:30am - 1:00pm.
• Bring a bluebook and blue or black ink pen.

• Review of the difficult material we discussed on Friday
• The Lewisian Objection to Plantinga's Theodicy

• Rowe's Version of the Problem of Evil
• The G.E. Moore Shift

• In addition to Review Day (Friday), there will be a Review Session on Monday, Dec. 18 at 1:30 p.m. Room: TBA.

• Review for Final Exam

• There will be a Review Session on Monday, Dec. 18 at 1:30 p.m. in HLMS 247.  Come with questions!