Analytical Contents
1 The Problem of Political Authority 3
1.1 A Political Parable 3
A private party who performed acts analogous to those of the state would be strongly condemned. The state is not condemned because it is thought to possess ‘authority’.
1.2 The Concept of Authority: A First Pass 5
Political authority involves both political obligation and political legitimacy.
1.3 Actions versus Agents: The Need for Authority 7
The difference between our attitudes toward the government and our attitudes toward vigilantes is not due to a difference in their actions, but to a perceived difference in the agents.
1.4 The Significance of Coercion and the Reach of Authority 8
An account of authority is needed due to the ethical import of coercion. Many government policies depend on belief in authority.
1.5 The Concept of Authority: A Second Pass 11
The usual conception of authority includes five conditions: generality, particularity, content-independence, comprehensiveness, and supremacy.
1.6 A Comment on Methodology 14
The best approach to political philosophy involves reasoning from common sense moral judgments.
1.7 Plan of the Book 17
Part I explains why the state lacks authority. Part II explains how a society can function without authority. Readers should not dismiss the book merely because of its radical thesis.
2 The Traditional Social Contract Theory 20
2.1 The Social Contract Orthodoxy 20
The social contract theory hypothesizes a contract requiring citizens to obey the state and the state to protect the citizens.
2.2 The Explicit Social Contract Theory 21
It is not plausible that such a contract was ever explicitly accepted.
2.3 The Implicit Social Contract Theory 22
Some argue that we accept the social contract implicitly, through our actions.
2.4 Conditions for Valid Agreements 24
Valid contracts satisfy four principles: (1) valid consent requires a reasonable way of opting out; (2) explicit dissent trumps alleged implicit consent; (3) an action can be taken as communicating agreement only if the agent believed that if he did not take the action, the agreement would not have been imposed on him; (4) contractual obligation is mutual and conditional.
2.5 Is the Social Contract Valid? 27
2.5.1 The Difficulty of Opting Out 27
There is no way of opting out of the social contract without giving up things one has a right to.
2.5.2 The Failure to Recognize Explicit Dissent 29
The state does not recognize explicit rejections of the social contract.
2.5.3 Unconditional Imposition 30
The alleged social contract is imposed on citizens almost regardless of what they do.
2.5.4 The Absence of Mutual Obligation 31
The state officially renounces any obligations toward individuals.
2.6 Conclusion 34
The traditional social contract theory fails.
3 The Hypothetical Social Contract Theory 36
3.1 Arguments from Hypothetical Consent 36
Some philosophers seek to base political authority on the claim that citizens would consent to a social contract in some hypothetical scenario.
3.2 Hypothetical Consent in Ordinary Ethics 37
Hypothetical consent is valid only when actual consent is unavailable, and the hypothetical consent is consistent with the parties’ actual philosophical beliefs and values.
3.3 Hypothetical Consent and Reasonableness 39
3.3.1 Hypothetical Agreement as Evidence of
Reasonableness 39
Some argue that hypothetical consent shows that a political arrangement is reasonable.
3.3.2 Could Agreement Be Reached? 40
There is no reason to think that all reasonable persons could agree on a social contract.
3.3.3 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent 43
The reasonableness of a contract does not make it obligatory for parties to accept it, nor render it permissible to force parties to do so.
3.4 Hypothetical Consent and Ethical Constraints 45
3.4.1 Rawls’ Contract Theory as an Account of Authority 45
John Rawls, the most influential political philosopher, advances a hypothetical social contract theory.
3.4.2 Could Agreement Be Reached? 48
There is no reason to think agreement could be reached in Rawls’ hypothetical scenario.
3.4.3 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 1:
The Appeal to Fair Outcomes 50
The fairness of a contract does not make it obligatory for parties to accept it, nor make it permissible to force parties to do so.
3.4.4 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 2:
Sufficient Conditions for Reliable Moral Reasoning 51
Rawls’ scenario embodies some necessary conditions, but not sufficient conditions, for reliable moral reasoning. Sufficient conditions would require complete and correct values.
3.4.5 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 3:
Necessary Conditions for Reliable Moral Reasoning 54
Rawls cannot show that no competing theory satisfies his necessary conditions for acceptable moral reasoning.
3.5 Conclusion 56
Hypothetical consent cannot save the social contract theory.
4 The Authority of Democracy 58
4.1 Naive Majoritarianism 58
In common sense morality, majority will does not generate obligations to comply or entitlements to coerce.
4.2 Deliberative Democracy and Legitimacy 59
4.2.1 The Idea of Deliberative Democracy 59
Joshua Cohen articulates conditions for ideal deliberation in a democratic society.
4.2.2 Deliberative Democracy as Fantasy 60
No actual society satisfies any of Cohen’s conditions.
4.2.3 The Irrelevance of Deliberation 63
Even if Cohen’s conditions were satisfied, they could not ground authority. No deliberative process suffices to erase individuals’ rights against coercion.
4.3 Equality and Authority 64
4.3.1 The Argument from Equality 64
Thomas Christiano derives political obligation from an obligation of justice to support equality and respect others’ judgment.
4.3.2 An Absurdly Demanding Theory of Justice? 66
Christiano’s conception of justice must be either absurdly demanding or too weak to generate political obligations.
4.3.3 Supporting Democracy through Obedience 69
Obedience to the law is not a meaningful way of supporting democracy.
4.3.4 Is Democratic Equality Uniquely Public? 69
The democratic interpretation of the value of equality is not uniquely publicly realizable. Either many interpretations of equality can be publicly realized, or none can.
4.3.5 Respecting Others’ Judgments 71
There is no duty to respect others’ judgment if you know that their judgment is in fact defective.
4.3.6 Coercion and Treating Others as Inferiors 73
The state treats citizens as inferiors by forcing citizens to obey its will.
4.3.7 From Obligation to Legitimacy? 75
The obligations to support equality and to respect others’ judgments are not the sort of obligations that it is appropriate to enforce coercively.
4.4 Conclusion 77
The democratic process does not confer authority on its outcomes.
5 Consequentialism and Fairness 78
5.1 Consequentialist Arguments for Political Obligation 78
5.1.1 The Structure of Consequentialist Arguments for
Political Obligation 78
Some argue that we have a duty to promote certain large goods that can only be promoted through obedience to the state.
5.1.2 The Benefits of Government 78
Government protects us from criminals and foreign governments and provides consistent rules for social coordination.
5.1.3 The Duty to Do Good 80
When one can prevent something very bad with minimal cost, one ought to do so.
5.1.4 The Problem of Individual Redundancy 81
An individual’s obedience has no impact on the state’s ability to provide key social benefits.
5.2 Rule Consequentialism 82
It is not wrong to do something merely because it would be bad if everyone did it.
5.3 Fairness 83
5.3.1 The Fairness Theory of Political Obligation 83
Some argue that one must obey the law because disobedience is unfair to other citizens.
5.3.2 Obedience as the Cost of Political Goods 85
For many laws, obedience has no connection with the state’s ability to provide the crucial benefits that are supposed to justify its existence.
5.3.3 Political Obligation for Dissenters 88
Those who disagree with a policy do not act unfairly in refusing to cooperate with it.
5.3.4 Particularity and the Question of Alternative Goods 89
There is no need to obey the law if one can do something more socially beneficial instead.
5.4 The Problem of Legitimacy 90
5.4.1 A Consequentialist Account of Legitimacy 90
Some argue that the state may coerce individuals because doing so is necessary to achieve great goods.
5.4.2 Comprehensiveness and Content-Independence 91
Consequentialist arguments can only justify imposition of a narrow range of correct policies.
5.4.3 Supremacy 94
Consequentialist arguments cannot explain why non-state actors should not be entitled to do the same things as the state, nor why they may not use coercion against the state.
5.5 Conclusion 96
Consequentialist and fairness-based arguments do not establish political authority.
6 The Psychology of Authority 98
6.1 The Relevance of Psychology 98
6.1.1 Is This Book Dangerous? 98
Some believe that it is dangerous to undermine belief in authority.
6.1.2 The Appeal to Popular Opinion 99
Some believe that the rejection of authority is too far from common sense political beliefs to be taken seriously.
6.2 The Milgram Experiments 102
6.2.1 Setup 102
Milgram devised an experiment in which subjects would be ordered to administer electric shocks to helpless others.
6.2.2 Predictions 104
Most people expect that subjects will defy the orders of the experimenter.
6.2.3 Results 105
Two thirds of subjects obey fully, even to the point of administering apparently lethal shocks.
6.2.4 The Dangers of Obedience 105
The experiment shows that belief in authority is very dangerous.
6.2.5 The Unreliability of Opinions about Authority 106
The experiment also shows that people have a strong pro-authority bias.
6.3 Cognitive Dissonance 107
People may seek to rationalize their own obedience to the state by devising theories of authority.
6.4 Social Proof and Status Quo Bias 110
People are biased toward commonly held beliefs and the practices of their own society.
6.5 The Power of Political Aesthetics 112
6.5.1 Symbols 112
The state employs symbols to create an emotional and aesthetic sense of its own power and authority.
6.5.2 Rituals 114
Rituals serve a similar function.
6.5.3 Authoritative Language 116
Legal language and the language of some political philosophers serves to encourage feelings of respect for authority.
6.6 Stockholm Syndrome and the Charisma of Power 119
6.6.1 The Phenomenon of Stockholm Syndrome 119
Kidnapping victims sometimes emotionally bond with their captors, as in the case of the Stockholm bank robbery.
6.6.2 Why Does Stockholm Syndrome Occur? 121
The syndrome may be a defensive mechanism.
6.6.3 When Does Stockholm Syndrome Occur? 122
The syndrome is most likely to develop when one is under the power of another who poses a serious threat, one cannot escape or overpower one’s captor, the captor shows some signs of mercy, and one is isolated from the outside world.
6.6.4 Are Ordinary Citizens Prone to Stockholm
Syndrome? 123
Subjects of a government satisfy the conditions for the development of Stockholm Syndrome and also show some of its symptoms.
6.7 Case Studies in the Abuse of Power 125
6.7.1 My Lai Revisited 125
In the My Lai massacre, soldiers were just following orders. One soldier who helped the villagers was reviled as a traitor.
6.7.2 The Stanford Prison Experiment 126
Volunteers participated in a simulation of prison life. The guards became increasingly abusive toward the prisoners.
6.7.3 Lessons of the SPE 127
Power leads people to inflict pain and humiliation on others. Those who are not corrupted do little to restrain those who are.
6.8 Conclusion: Anatomy of an Illusion 130
The common belief in authority is the product of non-rational biases. Belief in authority is socially harmful.
7 What If There Is No Authority? 132
7.1 Some Policy Implications 133
7.1.1 Prostitution and Legal Moralism 133
If there is no authority, legal moralism, as in the case of laws against prostitution, is unjustified.
7.1.2 Drugs and Paternalism 134
Legal paternalism, as in the case of drug laws, is unjustified.
7.1.3 Rent-Seeking 136
Laws motivated by rent-seeking are obviously unjustified.
7.1.4 Immigration 137
Immigration restrictions are unjustified.
7.1.5 The Protection of Individual Rights 138
Laws that protect individual rights are justified.
7.1.6 Taxation and Government Finance 139
Taxation is justified if and only if voluntary methods of government finance prove unworkable.
7.2 The Case of Aid to the Poor 143
7.2.1 Welfare and Drowning Children 143
It is sometimes permissible to force someone to help a third party in an emergency. This principle might be used to justify government social welfare programs.
7.2.2 The Utility of Anti-Poverty Programs 144
It is debatable whether government anti-poverty programs are overall beneficial.
7.2.3 Are Poverty Programs Properly Targeted? 146
Government anti-poverty programs ignore the interests of extremely needy people in other countries to focus on slightly needy people in one’s own country.
7.2.4 A Clash of Analogies: Drowning Children and
Charity Muggings 148
Government social programs are more similar to a practice of mugging people to collect money for charity than to a case of forcing a stranger to save a drowning child.
7.2.5 In Case the Foregoing Is Wrong 153
Even if the foregoing arguments are wrong, the case of aid to the poor does not support political authority, since the state would still have no greater rights than a private citizen.
7.3 Implications for Agents of the State 155
Government employees should refuse to implement unjust laws.
7.4 Implications for Private Citizens 157
7.4.1 In Praise of Disobedients 157
Civil disobedience is justified in response to unjust laws.
7.4.2 On Accepting Punishment 158
Disobedients should evade punishment when possible.
7.4.3 On Violent Resistance 160
Violent resistance is usually unjustified, since it typically harms innocent people without achieving its aims.
7.4.4 In Defense of Jury Nullification 162
It is morally wrong for a jury to convict a defendant under an unjust law.
7.5 Objections in Support of Rule-Worship 163
7.5.1 May Everyone Do Whatever They Want? 163
The rejection of authority does not entail that individuals may do whatever they wish or whatever they believe correct.
7.5.2 Procedure versus Substance 165
No purely procedural criterion for obedience to the law is needed. Assessing the appropriateness of disobedience requires recourse to substantive moral principles.
7.5.3 Undermining Social Order? 166
Rather than leading to a collapse of social order, a widespread skepticism of authority would most likely lead to a much freer and more just society.
7.5.4 The Consequences of the Doctrine of Content-
Independence 168
No large institution can be expected to avoid all moral errors. But such errors will be more frequent if we hold the view that the institution is entitled to make the occasional error.
7.6 A Modest Libertarian Foundation 169
We have derived libertarian conclusions from common sense morality, rather than from any controversial theoretical assumptions.
8 Evaluating Social Theories 175
8.1 General Observations on the Rational Evaluation of Social Theories 175
8.1.1 Rational Evaluation Is Comparative 175
One should not ask whether a social system is good absolutely, but whether it is better than the alternatives.
8.1.2 Rational Evaluation Is Comprehensive 176
One should consider a system’s overall benefits, rather than focusing on any single issue.
8.1.3 Varieties of Government and Anarchy 176
We should compare the best form of government to the best form of anarchy.
8.1.4 Against Status Quo Bias 177
We should avoid the bias in favor of our social status quo.
8.2 A Simplified Conception of Human Nature 179
8.2.1 Humans Are Approximately Rational 179
People usually do what makes sense given their goals and beliefs.
8.2.2 Humans Are Aware of their Environment 180
People usually know obvious, practically relevant facts about how the world works.
8.2.3 Humans Are Selfish but Not Sociopathic 181
People are largely selfish but accept some moral constraints and have some concern for friends, family, and neighbors.
8.2.4 On Behalf of Simplification 183
It is useful to consider a simplified account of human nature that identifies some large factors in human motivation.
8.2.5 A Historical Application 184
The view of human nature just described explains such events as the failure of America’s first experiment with communism.
8.3 Utopianism and Realism 185
8.3.1 The Principle of Realism 185
Some social systems, while theoretically desirable, are too utopian to be of interest.
8.3.2 Prescription for a Realistic Anarchism 186
To be sufficiently realistic, anarchists must argue that their system could succeed with human nature as we know it to be, that their system would be stable, and that it could succeed in a limited area, assuming most people accepted anarchism. They need not argue that people are likely to accept the theory.
8.3.3 Against Utopian Statism 187
Moderate political theories can be utopian. Statists must not merely assume that governments will act as they should, nor that government officials are exempt from human nature.
9 The Logic of Predation 190
9.1 The Hobbesian Argument for Government 190
Hobbes argued that anarchy would be a state of war of all against all, but that a single absolute ruler would create peace.
9.2 Predation in the State of Nature 192
9.2.1 Game Theoretic Considerations 192
It is normally prudentially irrational to start fights with others, even in the absence of government.
9.2.2 Social Conditions Affecting the Prevalence of
Violence 194
The prevalence of violence is affected by cultural values, prosperity, and technology.
9.2.3 Interstate Violence 196
Interstate violence is not deterred as easily as interpersonal violence.
9.3 Predation in a Totalitarian State 197
Absolute rulers have little cause to care about their subjects’ rights or welfare and often commit horrible abuses.
9.4 Predation under Democracy 200
9.4.1 The Tyranny of the Majority 200
In a democracy, the majority may oppress the minority.
9.4.2 The Fate of Non-Voters 200
The government may ignore the rights and interests of non-voters, including foreigners affected by the government’s policies.
9.4.3 Voter Ignorance and Irrationality 201
Voters tend to be politically ignorant and irrational, since each voter knows his own vote will have no impact.
9.4.4 Activism: A Utopian Solution 205
Citizen activists cannot realistically be expected to keep watch over the thousands of everyday government activities.
9.4.5 The News Media: The Sleeping Watchdog 206
It is not in the interests of the news media to keep close watch over the government.
9.4.6 The Miracle of Aggregation 208
Popular biases are likely to swamp the small influence of the few informed and rational voters in a typical election.
9.4.7 The Rewards of Failure 210
It is not in the government’s interests to solve social problems, since governments get more money and power when social problems get worse.
9.4.8 Constitutional Limits 212
The government cannot be trusted to enforce the constitution against itself.
9.4.9 Of Checks, Balances, and the Separation of Powers 217
Different branches of government have no incentive to restrain each other.
9.5 Conclusion 219
Constitutional democracy with separation of powers is much better than totalitarianism, but it does not eliminate political predation.
10 Individual Security in a Stateless Society 221
10.1 A Non-State System of Justice 221
10.1.1 Protection Agencies 221
In an ungoverned society, competing security agencies would provide protection from crime.
10.1.2 Arbitration Firms 222
Disputes would be resolved through competing arbitration firms.
10.2 Is it Anarchy? 223
This system differs from traditional government in that it relies on voluntary relationships and meaningful competition among security providers.
10.3 Conflict between Protectors 224
10.3.1 The Costs of Violence 224
Since violence is extremely costly, security agencies would seek peaceful means of resolving disputes.
10.3.2 Opposition to Murder 225
Most people are strongly opposed both to committing murder and to being shot at. Warlike security agencies would therefore have difficulty retaining employees.
10.3.3 Conflict between Governments 227
The problem of interstate war is far greater than the potential problem of inter-agency war, because governments face much weaker obstacles to declaring unjust wars.
10.4 Protection for Criminals 229
10.4.1 The Profitability of Enforcing Rights 229
Protection of ordinary people is more profitable than protection of criminals.
10.4.2 Criminal Protection by Governments 230
In contrast, there is little to stop a government from protecting criminals rather than their victims.
10.5 Justice for Sale 231
10.5.1 Preexisting Entitlement 231
In one sense, individuals should not have to pay to have their rights protected. But those who provide protection cannot justly be asked to do so for free, and will not do so for free.
10.5.2 Basing Law on Justice 232
Laws should be based on justice, rather than profitability. Anarchists are no less capable of embracing this norm than supporters of a governmental society.
10.5.3 Buying Justice from Government 232
Governmental systems also require individuals to pay to have their rights protected and also may base laws on things other than justice.
10.6 Security for the Poor 234
10.6.1 Do Businesses Serve the Poor? 234
Most industries are dominated by production for low- and middle-income customers. Protection agencies will provide services for low- and middle-income customers.
10.6.2 How Well Does Government Protect the Poor? 235
Government does little to protect the poor.
10.7 The Quality of Protection 236
Private protection agencies would provide higher quality, cheaper services than government police forces, for the same reasons that private provision of most other goods is cheaper and of higher quality.
10.8 Organized Crime 237
Criminal organizations would be financially crippled by the legalization of such goods and services as gambling, prostitution, and drugs.
10.9 Protection or Extortion? 239
10.9.1 The Discipline of Competition 239
Competition prevents protection agencies from becoming abusive.
10.9.2 Extortion by Government 242
Governments face very little competitive pressure and can therefore get away with far more abusive behavior than a private protection agency.
10.10 Monopolization 243
10.10.1 The Size Advantage in Combat 243
Nozick argues that the protection industry would be monopolized due to customers’ desire to be protected by the most powerful agency. This wrongly assumes that the job of protection agencies is combat with other agencies.
10.10.2 Determining Efficient Size of Firms 244
In the protection industry, the most efficient size for a firm would be quite small. This would enable many firms to coexist.
10.10.3 Government Monopoly 246
Those who oppose monopolies should oppose the largest of all monopolies, that of government.
10.11 Collusion and Cartelization 247
10.11.1 The Traditional Problem for Cartels 247
Individual members of a cartel have an incentive to defect against the cartel.
10.11.2 Cartelization by Threat of Force 247
It is unlikely that a protection industry cartel would be enforced through violence between protection agencies.
10.11.3 Cartelization through Denial of Extended
Protection 249
Nor could an industry cartel be enforced through a threat to refuse to protect customers of non-cartel agencies.
10.12 HOA versus Government 250
HOAs are superior to (traditional) governments because HOA membership is voluntary and there is meaningful competition among HOAs.
10.13 Conclusion 252
Privatization of the protection industry would result in higher quality with lower costs and fewer undesired side effects than the governmental system.
11 Criminal Justice and Dispute Resolution 254
11.1 The Integrity of Arbitrators 254
Arbitration firms would depend on a reputation for fairness and wisdom to attract customers.
11.2 Corporate Manipulation 255
Businesses do not gain greater profits by making unreasonable demands in regard to dispute resolution mechanisms or anything else.
11.3 Refusing Arbitration 258
Protection agencies would refuse to protect clients who reject arbitration.
11.4 Why Obey Arbitrators? 259
Agencies would refuse to protect clients who violate arbitration judgments.
11.5 The Source of Law 259
Law is best made through contracts and by judges rather than by a legislature.
11.6 Punishment and Restitution 261
The anarchist justice system would focus on restitution rather than punishment.
11.7 Uncompensable Crimes 262
Judges would have to decide what to do in cases of crimes for which compensation is impossible.
11.8 Excess Restitution 262
Criminals might face somewhat higher compensation demands than were truly just. This would not bring down the system and would not be obviously worse than the overpunishment problem in existing governmental systems.
11.9 The Quality of Law and Justice under a Central Authority 266
11.9.1 Wrongful Convictions 266
In the present system, many people are wrongly convicted.
11.9.2 Oversupply of Law 268
Too many laws are made.
11.9.3 The Price of Justice 270
Governmental justice systems are unreasonably expensive and time-consuming.
11.9.4 The Failure of Imprisonment 271
Imprisonment leads to prisoner abuse and high rates of recidivism.
11.9.5 Reform or Anarchy? 272
Governments are slow to reform for reasons inherent in the incentive structures of government-based systems. A shift to a free market model would make numerous improvements more likely.
11.10 Conclusion 274
Privatization of the legal system would result in higher quality, lower costs, and fewer defects in general than government-based legal systems.
12 War and Societal Defense 276
12.1 The Problem of Societal Defense 276
Some argue that only a government can protect society against other governments.
12.2 Non-governmental Defense 277
12.2.1 Guerilla Warfare 277
Guerilla warfare has proved surprisingly effective at expelling foreign occupiers.
12.2.2 The Difficulty of Conquering an Ungoverned
Territory 279
An invading army would face large costs in conquering and establishing government in an ungoverned territory.
12.2.3 Nonviolent Resistance 279
Nonviolent resistance has proved remarkably effective at ending governmental oppression.
12.2.4 Conclusions 282
An anarchic society has plausible means of defense against foreign invaders.
12.3 Avoiding Conflict 283
12.3.1 Natural Human Aggression 284
Some argue that war is inevitable due to natural human aggression, but this theory is not plausible.
12.3.2 Land and Resources 285
To avoid war, an anarchist society should be established in a region lacking unusually large concentrations of valuable resources, and lacking a history of territorial disputes.
12.3.3 Conflict Spirals and Intergovernmental Disputes 286
Most wars are caused by disputes between governments. These could be avoided by not having a government.
12.3.4 Power Relations 289
Many wars are caused by struggles between governments for international dominance. These could be avoided by not having a government.
12.3.5 The Liberal Democratic Peace 290
A society could avoid war by being surrounded by liberal democracies.
12.3.6 If You Desire War, Prepare for War 293
Military preparation does not prevent war. It increases the risk of war.
12.4 Avoiding Terrorism 297
12.4.1 The Terrorist Threat 297
The threat of terrorism may become serious in the future, due to the possibility of attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
12.4.2 The Roots of Terrorism 299
Terrorism almost always occurs in retaliation for government actions.
12.4.3 Violent and Nonviolent Solutions 301
The best way to avoid terrorism is to eschew policies that provoke it, rather than attempting to incapacitate all potential terrorists.
12.5 The Dangers of ‘National Security’ 303
12.5.1 The Risk of Unjust Aggression 303
Maintenance of a standing army creates a risk that one’s government will commit unjust aggression.
12.5.2 The Risk of Global Disaster 304
Governmental militaries pose a risk of destroying the human species.
12.6 Conclusion 306
A governmental military is not necessary for security and may actually increase our danger.
13 From Democracy to Anarchy 308
13.1 Against Presentist Bias: The Prospects for Radical
Change 308
Radical social changes have occurred in the past and will probably occur more quickly in the future.
13.2 Steps toward Anarchy 311
13.2.1 Outsourcing Court Duties 312
A society could approach the privatization of the justice system by delegating certain court cases to private arbitrators. This process has already begun.
13.2.2 Outsourcing Police Duties 313
The move toward privatization of police functions is also underway. Governments have outsourced a few police duties to private security guard companies.
13.2.3 The End of Standing Armies 314
The end of standing armies may come about through a global cultural shift and a gradual ratcheting down of military forces.
13.2.4 The Rest of the Way 315
Once the military was eliminated and courts and police privatized, someone would probably figure out how to make the politicians go home.
13.3 The Geographical Spread of Anarchy 316
Anarchy is most likely to begin in small countries or parts of countries. If the results were promising, the idea would spread.
13.4 The Importance of Ideas 317
The eventual arrival of anarchy is plausible due to the long-run tendency of human knowledge to progress, and the influence of ideas on the structure of society.
13.5 Conclusion 320
13.5.1 The Argument of Part I 320
Authority is illusory.
13.5.2 The Argument of Part II 321
Society can function without government.
13.5.3 The Argument of this Chapter 322
Anarchy is attainable.