Painting Too ‘Rosie’ a Picture:
The Impact of External Threat on Women’s Economic Welfare

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Abstract: Why is the economic status of women better in one country than another? We maintain that the answer lies in part in the extent of external threat to the homeland territory a country faces. Our project furthers the research showing that the undesirable effects of interstate territorial conflict extend to domestic politics of countries involved by arguing that the presence of territorial threat also negatively impacts the economic welfare of women. To respond to the threat, states tend to centralize their decision-making, invest more in the military, and decrease citizens’ liberties. Associated restrictions and emphases on more “masculine” values create an environment where women’s welfare takes a back seat to the ostensible priority of defending the homeland. Utilizing measures of women’s unemployment from across the world, our analyses over the 1981-2001 period demonstrate that higher levels of territorial threat decrease women’s economic welfare. This extends both the research into pernicious effects of territorial conflict and qualifies the finding from gender research that women’s economic situation typically improves during the times of war as women take over jobs from the male population that is at the front.
Painting Too ‘Rosie’ a Picture:  
The Impact of External Threat on Women’s Economic Welfare

Why is the economic status of women better in one country than another? We argue that the answer lies in part in the extent of external threat to the homeland territory a country faces. Recent work shows that territorial control disagreements have a substantial negative impact on the domestic politics of countries involved, including inviting diversionary behavior (Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Tir 2010), inhibiting democratization (Gibler 2012; Gibler and Tir 2010; 2014), and resulting in discriminatory attitudes toward minority ethnic and religious populations (Hutchison and Gibler 2007). Our study argues that threat to the homeland territory also negatively impacts the economic status of women. In threatened societies, the welfare of women takes a back seat to the ostensible priority of defending the homeland and – additionally – the sense of threat helps reinforce and increase gender stereotypes, further constraining women.

While a solid basis demonstrating negative impacts of civil wars on women is starting to emerge (e.g. Goldstein 2001; Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Hynes 2004), our understanding of how threats external to the state affect the status of women is rather rudimentary. Some earlier research paints a rather rosy picture where the status of women advances during the times of interstate war, such as women entering the workforce while men are at the front. During World War II, for example, women were mobilized to work for the war effort (Milkman 1987; Yellin 2010). In India, women were temporarily allowed to work in the mines during the war because there was a coal shortage. In the U.S., women took over jobs that were otherwise reserved for men (Milkman 1987). Beyond blue collar jobs, women were offered editorial jobs at magazines, became involved in politics, went to school to become doctors, and participated in US baseball (Yellin 2010). Economically speaking, it would seem as though women benefited notably from interstate conflict. Yet, we point out that the effects of external threat on women are not as uniformly positive. As a result of interstate wars, women often become targets of sexual

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1 For helpful comments, we thank the participants of the Territory Workshop at the University of Tennessee, June 2015, two anonymous reviewers, and special issue and journal editors. The dataset, online appendix, and other supporting materials used to produce this article can be accessed via a supplementary data file hosted on Sage’s CMPS website.
violence, as perpetrated by the Japanese, Soviet, and German soldiers during World War II (Wood 2006).

We go beyond how a wartime-specific period affects women, to consider broader cross-national variation in the external threat to the state’s homeland territory. Wars – and even militarized disputes – are rather rare events, so assuming that women are impacted only during such infrequent – and usually relatively short – times is arguably problematic. Countries threaten one another often without engaging in actual fighting all that frequently (e.g. the US-Soviet Union rivalry lasted for decades but produced relatively few actual militarized confrontations and no direct wars). We thus argue that the expectation of militarized conflict is a relevant factor to be considered, as societies necessarily adopt defensive postures and strategies due to expecting attacks.

We maintain that threat-response dynamics negatively affect women. Women’s status suffers as the pressures created by territorial threats may de-prioritize policies meant to enhance women’s welfare and create an environment conducive to restrictions and the increased desirability for more “masculine” traits. In fact, one can argue that because of women’s greater support for family and household issues – rather than for issues related to national defense, military, and hawkish foreign policies – they represent a population of whom loyalty-demanding leaders would be particularly skeptical (Smith 1984; Clements 2011). To put simply, because stereotypes give the expectation that women are more pacific than their male counterparts, the state may implement policies that restrict women, and the increased societal support of such stereotypes will likely lead to increased support for related policy changes. A result of these dynamics is decreased women’s welfare in threatened societies, a pattern that arguably extends much more broadly than research focusing only on active wartime would suggest.

To evaluate our argument empirically, we depart from the norm of relying on the well-known Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2013). As Caprioli et al. (2009) point out, by focusing perhaps too much on a country’s laws, measures of women’s rights, including CIRI, do not adequately capture the daily-lived experiences of women – such as employment (in)equality. And that laws meant to address discrimination sometimes fail to deliver on their goals is well

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2 See Carli (1999; 2001); Burgess and Borgida (1999); Goldstein (2001).
known in the legal literature (see e.g. Siegel 1997; Ruane 2000; Okereke 2006).

We evaluate our hypothesis that external threat to the state’s homeland territory lowers women’s economic welfare across the world over the years 1981-2001. Our findings show that women’s employment opportunities are negatively impacted by external territorial threat. So while economic discrimination against women may not always be apparent in the laws enacted by the state, accounting for women’s lived experiences tells a different story.

In the remainder of this study we provide brief overviews of the works on conflict and gender. Our theoretical section linking external territorial threat and women’s economic welfare follows. We then deal with research design issues, followed by the discussion of our findings. Concluding thoughts close the article.

Women in Threatened Societies

Why does the welfare of women matter? As Nussbaum (1995) asserts, “Women, a majority of the world’s population, receive only a small proportion of its opportunities and benefits. According to the 1993 UN Human Rights Report, there is no country in the world in which women’s quality of life is equal to that of men…” (2). By restricting women, the state not only does disservice to its citizens, but also potentially limits its overall opportunities for economic growth and development by limiting the available quantity of human capital (Klasen 2002).

In this study, we suspect that countries that are particularly prone to adapting such self-injuring restrictions are the ones facing high levels of external threat to their homeland territories. Some threat-triggered responses are meant to deal with the threat more effectively. For instance, territorial threats to the homeland cause the state to centralize its decision-making and militarize, ostensibly to better confront the external threat. Yet, other threat-triggered responses do not have such strategic bases, but are rather functions of de-prioritizing policies that would help women or are reflections and intensifications of extant prejudices. Hutchinson and Gibler (2007) show this to be the case with increased levels of discrimination towards minority ethnic and religious groups in societies finding themselves under a
territorial threat. And Tir and Singh (2015; see also Hutchinson 2014) find attitudes of social intolerance of minorities to increase in the wake of civil wars fought over territorial issues. We argue that women’s economic welfare suffers a similar fate in societies that experience higher levels of external threat.

Some of the general tendencies to discriminate against women under the condition of threat can already be seen in the literature on how civil and interstate wars affect women. As Goldstein (2001) posits, civil war leads the state and society to (further) polarize by gender: traditional stereotypes are not only reinforced, but they also increase. Furthermore, during civil war, women become victims of greater levels of poverty, higher death rates, selling sex for food, etc. (Hynes 2004). While not only women are negatively affected by civil war, the reasons that men are targeted, and how they are targeted, are typically different than why women become targets of the state or the insurgency (Watts and Zimmerman 2002). Women are particularly subject to greater economic hardship, displacement, and sexual violence during times of conflict, more so than men (Plümper and Neumayer 2006).

Turning to interstate war, some of the literature reports positive news regarding women. Women are given new work opportunities that aid the war effort (Milkman 1987; Yellin 2010). Furthermore, women are given employment opportunities that help boost society’s morale, as happened in the US during World War II when women in the US were able to play baseball (Yellin 2010). While these may be temporary and case-specific benefits, as occurred for women in India when they were put to work in the coalmines (Yellin 2010), women often face increased (economic) discrimination during interstate wars. Women are prevented from holding high-risk jobs where they would be on the frontlines of war. As Carter (1996: 109) explains, women lack political equality, and as a result, they “… are not required to adopt the so far exclusively masculine obligation of fighting for their country.” Beyond inequality within a state’s military, much research shows that soldiers frequently rape civilians during interstate war, as occurred during WWII by Japanese, Soviet, and German soldiers (Wood 2006), and this occurs in both interstate and civil wars (Watts and Zimmerman 2002). When women are sent to war as combatants, however, they face more than the possibilities of being wounded or killed by enemy forces and confronting issues of rape against civilians; they also face being raped by men within their own military
unit. As Morris (1996) discusses, around 29% of American women serving in the Vietnam War faced sexual assault or rape.

While violence against women during war has been at the forefront of political discourse, what has yet to be researched is how external threats to the homeland affect women’s economic welfare across societies. Is women’s economic welfare undermined in externally threatened states? Or do women make broad economic gains, as research by Milkman (1987) and Yellin (2010) has found relating to the US and India during WW II? These are important questions to answer, and we seek to do so in this article.

**The Impact of External Territorial Threat on the Economic Status of Women**

In this study, we depart from examining the economic status of women specifically and solely during the times of active interstate conflict. War is a rare and relatively short event, and we argue that problematic state and societal practices are not limited only to wartime. Haglund and Richard’s article in this collection nicely illustrates this by demonstrating that residual negative consequences remain for women for some time after fighting’s cessation. We broaden this view by arguing that problematic consequences can also exist as countries prepare for war. States may be on a war footing but not actively engage one another militarily due to effective deterrence employed by the enemy. For example, India and Pakistan consistently threaten one another while engaging in actual militarized disputes only occasionally. It is the perception of threat, regardless of whether actual conflict involvement is observed, that will require countries to adopt defensive postures and strategies, which, we argue, have negative societal ramifications that include disadvantages to the economic welfare of women. Therefore, following Gibler (2012; see also Gibler and Tir 2014), we rely on the concept of threat – specifically, threat to the homeland territory – rather than on active war to explain negative societal ramifications.

A state existing in an environment threatening to its territory tends to have more centralized decision-making structures, an empowered military, and citizens who are discriminatory toward ethnic

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3 While beyond the scope of our study, researchers report that greater levels of gender equality may lead to less militarization within the state (Caprioli 2000; Melander 2005).
and religious minorities (Gibler 2012; Hutchinson and Gibler 2007; see also Hutchinson 2014 and Tir and Singh 2015). Our argument is that these negative dynamics extend to women as well. Women may suffer as policies meant to help them are not implemented or are discontinued (see Stojsavljevic 1995) and as resources are shifted toward agendas needed to defend the homeland (e.g. greater investments in military forces and weaponry). Thus, similar to Huber and Karim’s article in this collection, we maintain that a state’s external environment conditions how women fare in their societies. Yet, we do this in different ways. Huber and Karim investigate a potentially positive impact of international influences such as UN peacekeeping on women’s security sector participation; our focus is, meanwhile, on the more negative influence of the external environment.

External threat may exacerbate problems women face. That is, women may be specifically targeted for a number of reasons including, but not limited to, extant stereotypes, being peaceful and largely non-violent (Fukuyama 1998), having “special needs” during conflict (Security Council 2000), lacking education (Hill and King 1995), etc. Sjoberg’s article in this collection provides further evidence of such tendencies in the context of Syrian conflict, by demonstrating that women – not typically considered important and valuable in fighting the enemy – are portrayed in a way that is distinct from men.

More generally, sources of negative attitudes against women can be broken up into two main categories: descriptive and prescriptive. As Burgess and Borgida (1999) posit, descriptive discrimination means that there are specific “beliefs about the attributes, roles, and behaviors that characterize men and women” (666). Under this type of belief system, the discrimination against women could be inadvertent. Gender stereotypes that are prescriptive, in contrast, often stem from existing prejudices and animosities toward women. These include “beliefs about the attributes, roles, and behaviors to which men and women are expected to conform” (Burgess and Borgida 1999: 666).

Looking at women’s welfare through a descriptive lens, the government and citizens are likely to view women as less competent than their male counterparts. Per Carli (1999), women are often thought to lack “legitimate” power. As a result, their status is lower than that of men, and citizens and the
government may deny them influence on the state’s behavior (Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Carli 1999; 2001). For states facing an external territorial threat, these issues become more prominent, making women’s “incompetence” further highlighted. Preparation for warfare makes the government and society less likely to listen to women, as women are expected to promote non-violence, diplomacy, and negotiations with the enemy. This is consistent with a recent finding by Tir and Singh (2015) that, under heightened threat, women are less socially intolerant of perceived enemies than are men. A result would be that women are interpreted to be more favorably disposed toward perceived enemies, preferring more peaceful and conciliatory measures.

Although the intent of descriptive stereotypes is not necessarily to promote negative attitudes towards women, it often results in them – especially in the context of a threatening environment. Another consequence is that descriptive stereotypes may segue into prescriptive stereotypes, leading to greater gender hostilities within the state. Prescriptive expectations of women can arguably become even more evident in the context where the homeland faces high levels of external threat. While the government and public may expect all citizens to rally around the flag (Tir 2010; Tir and Singh 2013), skepticism of women could actually increase because of their ostensibly peaceful nature and expected opposition to war. Even though women will likely be pressured to support the war efforts, the expectations of gender roles increase the government and society’s likelihood to peg women as being disloyal and thereby limit their overall influence and/or welfare within the state.

_Women’s Economic Welfare_

Turning more specifically to women’s economic welfare, some of the literature on civil (Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers 2013) and interstate (Milkman 1987; Yellin 2010) wars show that women make economic gains during conflict due to an increase of employment opportunities. Nevertheless, we argue that, while some women may benefit, many women are also likely to face economic inequity if the homeland is threatened. Women’s economic welfare suffers in various ways. Negatively affecting their earning potential, women are restricted from holding public office or leadership positions; they are
restricted in jobs they can do within the military; women are viewed as unqualified for many jobs, and therefore, are often required to labor at a lower pay rate; and, the lack of economic opportunities can force women into prostitution as a means of survival for themselves and their families.

Women’s roles in public office are generally accepted when the state is able to focus on its citizens’ welfare, such as helping the poor or promoting family issues. In a state facing an external threat, however, gender stereotypes prevent women from being seen as effective leaders (Mueller 1986). As a result, a woman who is in a high-level political position in a state facing external threat will likely face pressure to take a more hardline approach or concede her position altogether to her male counterpart who is seen as more qualified to govern during crisis times. Similarly, women may be prevented from running for, or being appointed to, public office positions.

Women face further employment and economic inequity when the state refuses to allow women to have “dangerous” jobs, such as those within the military. During war, the vast majority of people fighting for the state are male, with very few exceptions (Goldstein 2001). The state may prevent women from fighting on the frontline because women are seen as weaker or more vulnerable than their male counterparts. While some states have conscripted both men and women, as did France, Norway, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom during World War II, women were often not recognized as combatants (Segal 1995). They were given jobs that were more civilian-like in quality and were generally not allowed to fire weapons. Additionally, in states facing higher levels of external threat, the military becomes more important in the society but probably seeks to employ fewer women as they are seen as too dovish – or whose place is supposed to be at home. A result is a reduced employment opportunity for women.

Women’s economic welfare can be expected to worsen in the civilian sector as well. This again includes ramifications of the heightened discriminatory attitudes, such as pressure on women to stay at home, bear children, or yield “real” jobs to men. This results in lowered ability and opportunity to find and hold jobs. An additional complication for women’s economic welfare is that educational opportunities for girls can be limited due to an external threat, as the societal expectations of girls focus
on their marriage and child bearing potential instead of them acquiring job skills. In combination with literacy rates often being lower for women, lack of training and education make it difficult for women to find jobs, especially ones that pay well. This prevents women from being able to take on high-paying male-dominated jobs that become vacant as men are conscripted or enlist in the military. Because women lack the training and education to perform specialized jobs, they often are left to work at farms or factories in order to survive. And, those who are unable obtain this type of work often resort to prostitution as a means of survival (Ashford and Huet-Vaughn 1997; Hynes 2004).

According to the logic we advance here, women’s economic welfare does not seem to be the uniformly rosy picture that is often described from the World War II literature that looks at the US, India, or the UK (Milkman 1987; Yellin 2010). Although some women may benefit economically in states encountering external threat, many women will struggle to provide for themselves and their families and resort to extreme measures for basic survival.

The logic and arguments presented above are further supplanted by the observation that the specific discriminatory practices are not the only sources of decreases in women’s economic welfare. Societies preparing for war face decisions over how to allocate scarce resources toward the defense effort vs. “butter” issues. Our expectation is that some of the latter category issues that are being sacrificed for the sake of defending the country will involve policies meant to help women economic status (e.g. girls’ literacy and women’s job-skills programs). As a result of discontinuation or lesser funding of women-empowering programs, women will consequently fare worse in such societies. Our discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_1: \text{Higher levels of external threat to the state’s homeland territory are associated with lower levels of economic welfare for women.} \]

*Legal Versus Behavioral Impact on Women*

The above discussion suggests that the status of women will be worse in countries facing increased levels of external territorial threat. The particular negative effects can take many forms, such as
be legislated, expressed in attitudes, or reflected in attainment by women. While proclivities toward all these can be expected under the condition of threat, we suspect that legally-based discrimination may not be as systematically observable. Passing laws that are clearly discriminatory against women would likely put a country in a vulnerable international position (e.g. it can lead to a withholding of economic or military aid). After all, democracy has become such a dominant form of governance in the international system that even non-democratic countries are increasingly expected to behave like democracies when it comes to both their foreign and domestic politics (see Mitchell 2012). On the latter point, this means that much pressure is put on all countries to follow democratic ideals and agendas of non-discrimination, broad support for human rights, and of eschewing various types of discrimination.

What this means is that countries under territorial threat may be reluctant to pass laws that specifically discriminate against or restrict women. Instead, practices negatively affecting women may well be taking on other forms. This has been well established in the legal literature. For example, Siegel (1997) shows that, while laws discriminating against race and gender made improvements, the track record of lived experiences of members of these groups remained poor. Similarly, Okerke (2006) notes that gender-sensitive laws within African countries are often not adequately enforced, and discriminatory attitudes against women remain pervasive.

These concerns are of high relevance to our study because the most commonly used data on the status of women, CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2013), rely mostly on countries’ legal frameworks. And the mere existence of laws does not necessarily equate to implementation and female-favorable societal programs and norms; see Siegel (1997), Ruane (2000), and Okereke (2006). While CIRI makes efforts to incorporate into its measures the extent of laws’ enforcement, the CIRI data still do not take into account the daily-lived experiences of women. These experiences need to be evaluated in order to gain a more complete understanding of what the status of women is really like within the territorially threatened state. As discussed in the next section, we therefore use data that tap into women’s actual economic achievements and lived experiences. A follow-up analysis utilizes the CIRI data on the status of women, relying in a large part on countries’ legal frameworks.
Research Design

Dependent Variables, Spatial-Temporal Domain, and Unit and Method of Analysis

Our dependent variable pertains to women’s economic welfare and focuses on women’s unemployment rates. To assess whether women fare worse than men under higher levels of external threat, we also obtain data on men’s unemployment rates. Both sets of unemployment data are taken directly from the World Bank (2014) and United Nations (2015). Our data cover all countries from 1981-2001, with the unit of analysis being country-year. The temporal span is restricted by the availability of the unemployment and territorial threat data. To test our hypothesis, we use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression with heteroskedastic panels.

Explanatory Variable: Territorial Threat

As noted above, we focus on territorial threat rather than actual militarized conflict involvement. Threat is a different concept than war because countries can be threatening each other without necessarily involving themselves in militarized fighting. And it is the perception of threat, regardless of whether actual fighting is observed, that will require countries to adopt defensive postures and strategies; these in turn, we argue, have negative societal ramifications, including disadvantages to the economic status of women.

We rely on the territorial threat measure provided by Gibler (2012). This is a predictive measure of probable, latent threat to the territorial core of the state. The measure is developed by first using common correlates of fatal militarized interstate disputes between contiguous states (e.g. border age, past militarized disputes over territory, past violent and peaceful border changes, alliances, militarization, colonial history) to obtain model coefficient estimates. These coefficients are then used along with observed data for each country and year to calculate, across all of the country’s neighbors, the latent probability of a fatal militarized dispute for each country, year, and neighbor. Reflecting the idea that the neighbor with the highest latent conflict probability is the most relevant one in terms of the threat to the
country, the calculated latent probability for this neighbor becomes the territorial threat value used in our models for the particular year. See Gibler and Tir (2014: 31-33) for full conceptual and methodological descriptions.

Control Variables

We control for a series of factors identified as important by the related literatures on (gender) discrimination. As Branisa et al. (2013) argue, to properly assess issues related to gender status, it is important to look at (sources of) broader social and political inequalities. These include issues such as civil liberties (e.g. freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion), level of the citizens’ physical integrity within the state, and GDP per capita. Similarly, Dollar and Gatti (1991) claim that looking at religious preferences and civil liberties can further help to properly isolate sources of gender inequality. We therefore control for a number of factors including: religious freedom, physical integrity, freedom of speech, electoral self-determination, an independent state judiciary, freedom of assembly (all from Cingranelli and Richards 2013), a country’s female to male ratio, the percent of the urban population (both from World Bank 2014), GDP per capita (United Nations 2015), and polity score (Polity IV Project 2013).

Empirical Results and Discussion

Table 1 presents the results of our empirical analyses. As can be seen from Model 1, the coefficient for the territorial threat variable is positive and significant, indicating that in states with higher levels of territorial threat women are more likely to be unemployed. This result is consistent with our hypothesis. Even though we do not expect the level of territorial threat or unemployment rate to change all that rapidly – and thus focus more on cross-sectional rather than temporal variation in our analysis – we nevertheless lag the territorial threat variable by one year; we do this to assure that the territorial threat level precedes the observed unemployment effects. As Model 2 shows, the results remain unchanged: (past) territorial threat levels increase women’s (current) unemployment rate.
We push our analysis further by considering whether external threat simply damages employment opportunities for all citizens about equally. Our theorizing suggests that women are affected particularly adversely, that is more so than men. In Model 3 we thus change the dependent variable to reflect the female-to-male unemployment ratio. The results again support our hypothesis: higher levels of territorial threat significantly increase women’s unemployment rates relative to those of men. Lagging the territorial threat level by a year in Model 4 yields a similar result. These findings therefore provide credence to a key point of our theorizing: societal threat-response dynamics are more damaging to the women’s economic status than to those of men.

In comparison to the other significant variables, the substantive impact of territorial threat on indicators of women’s economic welfare is notable. As can be expected, the most impactful variables are economic development and the polity score; women’s economic welfare tends to be better in democratic and economically developed countries. The substantive impact of the territorial threat variable is, meanwhile, similar to those of physical integrity, freedom of speech, urban population, and electoral self-determination variables. This bodes well for our study, as these conditions have all been identified by prior research as key variables in explaining the variance in the status of women across countries.

To illustrate our findings a bit further, we consider the impact of territorial threat in some high vs. low threat settings in the 1980s. For example, Nicaragua faced elevated levels of territorial threat at about 1.5 times the median level. Its female unemployment rates exceeded the median values, by the factor of 1.4. In contrast, Finland experienced relatively low territorial threat values, at about 80% of the median. Female unemployment was roughly at one-half of the median value. Within-country, over time comparisons reveal corresponding trends. Continuing to focus on the late 1980s, as Colombia’s borders came under threat, its territorial threat level rose by about 36%. Some of the effects included the 13% increase in female unemployment rate. Similarly, territorial threat levels increased in Israel, by factor of 1.3. Correspondingly, women’s unemployment rate increased by the factor exceeding 1.4. And, over a similar time period, Nicaragua’s territorial threat level increased by a factor of 1.2, resulting in the female
unemployment rate nearly doubling.

Follow-up Analyses

We further probe the robustness of our findings by conducting follow-up tests. A key concern is that our findings may be affected by unaccounted-for variations across countries. We deal with this issue in two ways. First, rather than over-saturating our models with even more control variables to account for potential spatial trends, we utilize the country fixed effects setup. The results of this analysis are shown in Models 5 and 6 of Table 2. As the models show, our conclusions remain the same. Higher levels of territorial threat continue to negatively affect women’s employment opportunities, whether considered on their own or in comparison to those of men. Second, because the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been identified as being particularly discriminatory against women, we control for the countries of the region by tagging them in our dataset with a MENA dummy variable. As Models 9 and 10 in Table 3 show, such concerns are borne out in our analysis. The MENA coefficients in both models are positive and significant, indicating that in this region women suffer worse unemployment rates, including when compared to those of men. But, importantly, the territorial threat coefficient still remains positive and significant, indicating that our findings hold even when we specifically account for the MENA countries.

(Tables 2 and 3 about here)

While in this project we are concerned more with understanding spatial rather than temporal variation in women’s economic circumstances, we nevertheless probe for a potential influence of unaccounted for time trends. Accordingly, in Models 7 and 8, Table 2 we re-assess our results by relying on year fixed effects. As the findings show, the substantive conclusions remain unchanged. Higher levels of territorial threat worsen women’s unemployment rates, both on their own and in comparison to those of men. And the implication is that these dynamics are not simply a function of particular temporal trends.

Next, considering our emphasis on the daily-lived experiences of women, we briefly investigate whether similar conclusions regarding our hypothesis can be drawn by simply relying on the more
legalistic measures captured in CIRI data. These economic rights concern equality in pay, hiring, and promotion, maternity leave, sexual harassment protections, etc. (Cingranelli and Richards, 2013: 77).

Replacing our dependent variable with a CIRI-based index measure of economic rights applicable to women, Table 4 in the Online Appendix presents the related results. While Model 11 shows that women’s economic rights are impacted negatively and significantly by higher levels of territorial threat, the finding is, however, quite sensitive to model specification and thus not robust. That is, the finding does not hold when we lag the territorial threat variable; see Model 12. We suspect that this lack of robust support for our hypothesis lies in the rather narrow, legalistic nature of the CIRI measures, which do not necessarily capture potential problematic behavior, practices, and outcomes. The danger of solely relying on CIRI data to assess women’s status would be that it may falsely obscure some of the economically-based discriminatory practices women face. Arguably, utilizing data that include women’s lived experiences paints a more accurate picture of the economic status of women in societies living under external territorial threat.

Finally, we conducted some exploratory analyses to gain preliminary insights into whether the nefarious effects of territorial threat may be blunted in wealthier and democratic societies. Interacting the related variables with territorial threat suggests that economic development indeed conditions (i.e. lessens) the effect of territorial threat, while democracy does so less consistently. Although these effects are beyond the scope of the present study, our exploratory results suggest that they are worth investigating further in future research.

**Conclusion**

Our finding that women’s economic welfare is negatively affected by external threat is consistent with Plümper and Neumayer’s (2006) argument that women face economic hardships particularly during war. Our results, however, contradict those from Milkman (1987), Yellin (2010), and Menon and van der Meulen-Rodgers (2013). These authors argue that during times of war women receive economic benefits by having more available options for employment. Our evidence, unfortunately, does not support as
optimistic of a view. Looking through the lens of women’s unemployment shows that women are worse off in societies under higher levels of territorial threat.

Notably, however, these tendencies are not revealed as clearly when considering the most widely-used measure of women’s rights, CIRI. As we argue above, its rather narrow, legalistic nature potentially leaves out other avenues through which women could be affected negatively. And when the metric of women’s unemployment – either on its own or in comparison to that of men – is taken into account, evidence of reduced economic welfare for women in countries facing external threat to the homeland territory is much clearer. This gives credence to our argument that any measurements assessing women’s status should include women’s lived experiences. To exclude these indicators may lead to inaccurate and biased results (Caprioli et al. 2009).

Furthermore, our study expands on existing literature that shows external territorial threat to trigger state centralization of decision-making and discriminatory attitudes toward minority and religious groups (Gibler 2010; Hutchison and Gibler 2007). While previous research has demonstrated that minority groups suffer due to external threat, what had not been demonstrated is how women are affected. This left a gap in both territorial and gender literatures. We argue that threats to the homeland do not paint as rosy of picture for women as has been previously thought in some of the literature – and as conjured up in Rosie the Riveter imagery. Rather, women’s status is impacted negatively in states facing high external threat to the homeland.

Our study is of course but one step in understanding how women are affected by threats external to the state. Among other topics, future research could consider whether external threat also negatively impacts other aspects of women’s lived experiences, such as education completion and fertility rates. Additionally, future research could seek to integrate our findings that lower external threat leads to more gender-equal societies with the work showing that these societies are less conflict prone (Melander 2005). This would allow for developing a more complete picture of how international conflict and gender equality issues mutually affect one another.
References

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Table 1: The Effects of Territorial Threat on Women’s Economic Welfare

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<td><strong>Territorial Threat</strong></td>
<td>17.900</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.731</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.156)*</td>
<td>(0.166)*</td>
<td>(0.161)*</td>
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<td><strong>Territorial Threat (Lagged)</strong></td>
<td>15.923</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.731</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.050)*</td>
<td>(0.166)*</td>
<td>(0.161)*</td>
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<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)*</td>
<td>(0.008)*</td>
<td>(0.010)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female:Male Ratio</strong></td>
<td>4.661</td>
<td>-3.942</td>
<td>-4.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.483)*</td>
<td>(0.102)*</td>
<td>(0.105)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita (logged)</strong></td>
<td>-0.237</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.007)*</td>
<td>(0.008)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity Score</strong></td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)*</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Integrity</strong></td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)*</td>
<td>(0.011)*</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of Speech</strong></td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Self-Determination</strong></td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)*</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Judiciary</strong></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of Assembly</strong></td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.119)*</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Urban Pop.</strong></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0004)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>1,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Countries</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.05. All models use FGLS regressions with heteroskedastic panels.
Table 2: The Effects of Territorial Threat on Women’s Economic Welfare, Fixed Effects Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5: Women’s Unemployment Rate, country fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 6: Women:Men Unemployment Rates, country fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 7: Women’s Unemployment Rate, year fixed effects</th>
<th>Model 8: Women:Men Unemployment Rate, year fixed effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat (Lagged)</td>
<td>32.572 (9.220)*</td>
<td>1.557 (0.703)*</td>
<td>32.572 (7.234)*</td>
<td>1.557 (0.422)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom</td>
<td>-0.252 (0.539)</td>
<td>-0.119 (0.060)*</td>
<td>-0.252 (0.263)</td>
<td>-0.119 (0.019)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female:Male Ratio</td>
<td>2.832 (7.341)*</td>
<td>-4.469 (1.243)*</td>
<td>2.832 (2.020)</td>
<td>-4.469 (0.921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.771)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.103)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.008)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>0.011 (0.123)</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity</td>
<td>-0.104 (0.277)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.104 (0.050)*</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Speech</td>
<td>0.832 (0.765)</td>
<td>0.064 (0.066)</td>
<td>0.832 (0.321)*</td>
<td>0.064 (0.025)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Self-Determination</td>
<td>-0.892 (0.967)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.892 (0.562)*</td>
<td>0.011 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)*</td>
<td>0.00004 (0.0002)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.00004 (0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Assembly</td>
<td>-0.419 (0.047)*</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.419 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.001)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Urban Pop.</td>
<td>0.017 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.0001 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.0001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>1,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters by Year</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.05. All models use FGLS regressions with heteroskedastic panels
Table 3: The Effects of Territorial Threat on Women’s Economic Welfare, Controlling for MENA Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9: Women’s Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>Model 10: Women:Men Unemployment Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>14.828 (2.015)*</td>
<td>0.454 (0.131)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Freedom</td>
<td>0.258 (0.113)*</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.006)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female:Male Ratio</td>
<td>24.074 (1.397)</td>
<td>-2.569 (0.092)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.477 (0.114)*</td>
<td>0.020 (0.007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>0.180 (0.016)*</td>
<td>0.005 (0.001)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Integrity</td>
<td>0.014 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.0004 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Speech</td>
<td>0.026 (0.149)</td>
<td>0.021 (0.008)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Self-Determination</td>
<td>-0.067 (0.155)*</td>
<td>-0.0002 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Assembly</td>
<td>-0.230 (0.104)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Urban Pop.</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.0003)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>13.875 (0.387)*</td>
<td>0.716 (0.015)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 1,790 1,790  
Number of Countries 147 147

Note: *p<.05. All models use FGLS regressions with heteroskedastic panels. MENA designates countries of Middle East and North Africa.