

# Peter Auriol

## IV *Sent.* d. 12 q. 1 a. 1

*Does an accident have an essence and reality that is bounded and complete,  
or is it incomplete and unbounded?*

tr. Robert Pasnau (rev. version of Jan. 2007)

5 {109a}<sup>1</sup> I argue first that accidents have a being that is complete and bounded, as follows. That of which being is quidditatively predicated per se, in quid, and solitarily, has a being (entitatem) that is bounded (terminatam) and complete; for<sup>2</sup> the predicate is included in the subject. But an accident is of this sort. Therefore. The major premise is known, because being is said only of what has an essence; thus just as wise is said from wisdom, so being (esse) is said from essence, according to Augustine [*De trin.* XV.7]. I prove the minor premise, because it is true to say of every accidental reality, with everything else set aside, that being (ens) is predicated of it quidditatively and per se.

15 *On the contrary*, that which is not being, but of being (entis), does not have complete and bounded being (entitatem). But an accident is not a being, but of being, according to the Philosopher in *Met.* VII [1028a18-20]. Therefore.

*Reply.* I proceed as follows in this question. First, I state my intended conclusion. Second, I will explain it through some examples. Third, I will prove it.

### I.

20 *First*, I state the following proposition, that an accident is a true thing (*res*), on account of the opinion of the ancients who say that an accident is not a reality outside the soul. On the contrary, it is a thing that is not the substance itself. Nevertheless, it is not a bounded and complete thing without its substance. Thus it has a reality that is not its substance and yet it is not a thing that is divided<sup>3</sup> from its substance. Consequently, it is an absolutely undivided thing in its own right, yet it is not<sup>4</sup> divided relationally from the substance that is its subject.

### II.

30 *Second*, I state some examples. The first case is that of a line and point. For a line is an essence and thing that is not a point, but nevertheless it is not a bounded and complete essence without a point; rather, it is bounded by a point. It is also an undivided thing in its own right, yet it is not a thing divided relationally from a point. So too, conversely, a point is a reality distinct from the line's reality, but yet it is not a thing bounded (terminata) in its own right, but with the line. For it is the boundary (terminatio) of a line, since a point is not a thing

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<sup>1</sup> The text is from Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in quartum librum Sententiarum* (Rome, 1605), corrected by Toulouse Bibl. Mun. 243 (ff. 77r-78r), and by John Capreolus's almost verbatim paraphrase at II *Sent.* 18.1.2, in *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues (Turin: Cattier, 1903; repr. Frankfurt, Minerva, 1967), pp. 135-37. I owe thanks to Paul Bakker for a copy of the Toulouse manuscript.

<sup>2</sup> Supplying *enim* (Toulouse).

<sup>3</sup> Reading *divisa* (Toulouse) for *diversa* (Rome). This is a crucial emendation, because accidents and subjects are *distinct* things, even if not *divided* in Auriol's sense. Here and elsewhere, one might understand 'divided' as meaning something like *detached*. But the term in its various forms (*divisa*, *indivisa*, *indivisibilis*, etc.) is extremely difficult to capture, because it plays upon the principle that a genuine thing is a unity and hence is *indivisible*. (Compare Scotus, *Quaest Meta.* VIII.1 n. 25: "an accident, although it is in itself indivisible....") Hence Auriol goes on to insist here that "in itself" an accident is "absolutely undivided." In another sense, though, it is not divided from its subject, in the sense that it is attached to its subject.

<sup>4</sup> Reading *nec* (Toulouse) for *et sic* (Rome).

having a position, but the boundary (*terminus*) of the position.

40 So too<sup>5</sup> I imagine directly in the case of whiteness: that it is a certain undivided thing in its own right, but yet intrinsically unbounded, and bounded only by an extrinsic bound – namely, a surface. Thus from the whiteness and the surface there comes about one thing: not through their being linked together (*per copulationem*) in the way one complete thing is linked together with another complete thing and they are joined with one another, but through their being relationally indivisible in every way rather than through union or simultaneity – just as a point makes one thing with a line through internal indivisibility rather than through simultaneity or union.

45 Another example is this: just as a shape (from the fourth species of quality) stands to quantity, so an accident stands to its subject. But a shape is a certain thing that is not the thing the quantity is, and nevertheless it is not a bounded thing but instead is the boundary of the quantity. Thus rarity and lightness are [also] incomplete and unbounded realities, and are not bounded or completed without quantity – that is, without the subject’s having parts  
50 (*sine partibilitate*) – for it is impossible to conceive of lightness or rarity without those parts.<sup>6</sup>

Just as rarity is something undivided in its own right and yet not divided from quantity (that is, from the subject’s having parts), so I understand directly in the case at hand. And here there are no words we can use that are as appropriate as the words of Aristotle, who says that accidents are not beings unconditionally (*simpliciter*), but in a relative way  
55 (*secundum quid*), nor are they beings absolutely, but *of* being, because they are a disposition or qualification of being. {109b} Modern authors, [in contrast], explain “being in a relative way” as having being that is weak and in need of support,<sup>7</sup> which does not fit well with the Philosopher’s view.

### 60 III.

*Third*, I prove that conclusion through various arguments. The first is taken from the formal effect, the second from an accident’s unity with its subject, the third from inherence, the fourth a fortiori, and the fifth by deriving an impossibility.

#### 65 1.

As for the first, I argue as follows. [ $\alpha$ ] Form and formal effect are the same reality (*formalitas*). But [ $\beta$ ] the formal effect of an accident is not a thing divided from its subject; instead, the subject and the formal effect are one through their being internally indivisible. Therefore [ $\gamma$ ] the form or accident and its subject are not divided things, but are one through their being  
70 indivisible in every way.

I prove the antecedent [ $\alpha$ ] by authority and argument. The authority is Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VI. I prove it by argument as follows. [ $\alpha 1$ ] The formal effect of a form is to form, and the formal effect of an act is to actuate. So I prove first in general for every form as follows. [ $\alpha 1a$ ] The formal effect of a form and act is to form and actuate matter. Then I ask:  
75 Is the form the actualization itself, or is the actualization something deposited (*derelectum*) by the form in the subject? The second cannot be maintained, since what is deposited would be either [ $i$ ] something absolute or [ $ii$ ] something relational. If [ $i$ ] it were something absolute (as

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<sup>5</sup> Reading *Ita* (Toulouse) for *Item* (Rome).

<sup>6</sup> The example presupposes that an object’s rarity (or density) is a function of how diffuse its parts are.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Peter of Auvergne, “an accident is said to have the character of a being – not a being *simpliciter*, but a diminished being” (*In Meta.* VII.2, as quoted in Pini, “Substance, Accident,” p. 285n).

one doctor imagines), then quantity would deposit some sort of extension and redness would deposit reddening (*rubicundatio*). If so, then it follows that something can be actualized without the act, and formed without the form, because, as a result of its being absolute, God can through his power separate the thing deposited [from the form that gave rise to it]. Further, the form is then not a formal cause, but an efficient cause, for the form would in this way impress its effect in matter just as would an efficient cause. Nor [ii] can that which is deposited be something relational, for if it were a relation then to be actualized and formed will be to be related.

[α1b] Second, what genus and category will [the forming and actuating] belong to?<sup>8</sup> Perhaps it will be said that an active actualization belongs to the genus of *action*, and a passive actualization to the genus of *passion*.<sup>9</sup> If this is what is said, then it follows that an action is what comes out of form, and that a form informs and actuates only by acting. Then the causality of form will not be distinct from the causality of an agent.

[α2] Second, I prove the same antecedent as follows. If the act is distinct from the actualization, then just as matter is actualized through the act, so it will be actualized through the actualization. I then ask about the actualization of that actualization, whether it differs from the first or is the same. If it is the same, then the form, by parity of reason,<sup>10</sup> is the same as its actualization. If that actualization differs from *its* actualization,<sup>11</sup> then I ask about that, and so by always proceeding I would be asking to infinity.

[α3] Third, I prove that same antecedent from the intention of the Philosopher, who approved of the words of Lycophron in *Physics* I [185b26-86a3], who removed from propositions the word ‘is’, with the result that one should say *the wall whitens* more than *the wall is white*. And it is apparent from the terms themselves that saying *the wall whitens* is the same as saying *the wall is white*<sup>12</sup> – for there is only a grammatical difference here. Therefore either [i] *whiten* is the same as *whiteness*, and I have my conclusion, or [ii] it is a relation of the whiteness to its subject, which is an extrinsic relation and holds of the whiteness and its subject and is the very inherence of the whiteness, as some say. If one says the latter, then it follows that *to whiten* is not *to be such*, since a relation yields a denominations only of its own kind. Therefore *to whiten* is *to be related*, not *to be such*.<sup>13</sup> It follows from this that this predication, *the wall is white*, is not an absolute predication, but a relational one. It also follows that this predication, *the line is straight*, is much more a qualitative predication than is this one, *the surface is white*. The reason for this is that there is no<sup>14</sup> extrinsic relation between line and straightness, nor is being straight anything other than being {110a} undivided from the line. Likewise for rarity and the parts.

You will say that ‘whitening’ imports not [ii] a relation, but [iii] an absolute mode of that whiteness. On the contrary, I can understand such a mode without the whiteness, given

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<sup>8</sup> This paragraph might also be regarded as a second argument in support of the above claim that “the second cannot be maintained” (line 76). But it seems better to treat it as parallel to “I prove first in general...” (line 73).

<sup>9</sup> Scotus had placed inherence in the category of either action or passion (*Ord.* IV.12.1 n. 6).

<sup>10</sup> Omitting *et forma* (with Toulouse).

<sup>11</sup> Supplying *si differt illa actuatio a sua actuazione* (Toulouse).

<sup>12</sup> Supplying *et apparet de se ex terminis quod idem est dicere superficies albet et superficies est alba* (with Toulouse; om. Capreolus).

<sup>13</sup> The words ‘to be such’ translate *esse quale*, referring to the category of quality. If the predicate ‘is white’ is given a relational analysis, as Auriol’s opponent is made to suggest, then Auriol argues that it cannot be located in the category of quality. This is unacceptable, given that *white* is a paradigmatic example of a quality.

<sup>14</sup> Supplying *nullus* (Toulouse); *non* (Capreolus).

that the mode is absolute, and consequently I can understand white without whiteness.

115 Now I prove the minor [ $\beta$ ], that the formal effect of an accident is undivided<sup>15</sup> from  
its subject. For if the actualization is a thing divided from that which is actualized, then –  
since that actualization actuates the thing being actualized – I ask what that actuating of that  
actualization is. If you say that it is the same as that actualization, then I have my conclusion,  
because by parity of reason one might as well stop at the first. If it is distinct, then that will  
120 again actuate the thing that is actualized, and I ask about its actualization. If it is the same, I  
have my conclusion, that one might as well stop at the first. If it is distinct, this will go on to  
infinity. This is just as if I wished to prove that a point is not a thing divided from a line, for  
the reason that if the line were divided in this way from the point, or vice versa, then each  
would be bounded without the other, both the line without the point and the point without  
125 the line, and the point would not be the boundary of that line, but would be something  
impressing that boundary. So I say in the present case about the actualization and the thing  
being actualized.

From these [various arguments for premises  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ ], one such argument can be  
formed [for  $\gamma$ ]: When any two things are undivided – each from a third, that is<sup>16</sup> – then they  
130 are necessarily things undivided from each other. But accident and substance are undivided  
in one third thing: namely, in one formal effect; that is, in one formation and actualization.  
Therefore. Therefore an accident comes to constitute one thing with a substance through  
their being undivided in every way. I do not say that they are one reality, but they establish  
(*fundant*) one thing through being undivided, and this lack of division is called the compo-  
135 sition of an accident with its substance.

## 2.

The second principal argument for<sup>17</sup> the main conclusion is from an accident's unity with its  
subject, as follows: When several things make one thing with a unity that is a positive  
140 relation, rather than with a unity that is the negation of a relational division, then it is  
necessary that their unity be the unity of a heap. The proof is that this is how the  
Philosopher argues in *Metaphysics* VIII [ch. 6]. But an accident and a subject are not one in  
the way that a heap is. Therefore their union is not a relation, but a relational indivisibility, or  
the negation of division.

145 Even though the major premise is the Philosopher's, I nevertheless prove it by  
reason, because a heap is nothing other than a union from the aggregation of diverse things.

You will say that accident and subject establish that relation of union through their  
essences, and this is why they are not one thing in the way a heap is. This evasion does not  
go very far, because given that that relation is not unity, you have one thing through  
150 aggregation alone. You do not have a per se unity, because in something that is one per se it  
cannot be said that there is a mediating relation (*respectus medius*). Otherwise, 'white' would  
signify the subject, the whiteness, and the relation, and yet Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* VII  
text 12 that *white* is not in a genus because it signifies *two* things – he does not say *three*. Also,  
white would include in its essence the realities of three categories. Also, further, the unity of  
155 a quality with its subject would not be a unity reducible to the category of quality, but to the  
category of relation.

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<sup>15</sup> Reading *indivisus* (Toulouse) for *indivisio*.

<sup>16</sup> Supplying *scilicet a tertio* (Capreolus); *a tertio* (Toulouse).

<sup>17</sup> Supplying *ad* (Toulouse).

160 It must therefore be the case that accident and subject are one by unity or lack of  
division, not by union. This is the argument of the Commentator on *De anima* II comment 2,  
and of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* VIII [ch. 6] and the Commentator there [text 15]. For  
165 according to them there is no reason to be sought for why one thing is made from subject  
and accident – just as for why one thing is made from the wax and its shape. If, however,  
they were one thing through a relation, then there *would* be a reason to be sought. But when  
it is maintained that the shape and the wax ground a lack of division rather than a relation,  
then {110b} it becomes clear that there is not a reason to be sought. Thus the Commentator  
170 remarks, as cited above, that an aggregate is said to be one thing only through unity from  
form. On this basis one can understand *Metaphysics* VIII texts 15-16: how is one thing made  
from matter and form, and how from subject and accident? For they make one thing per se,  
which would not be true if their unity were relational. But they make one thing inasmuch as  
they come together without division in one thing third – namely, in the composite. This is  
one thing through the lack of division of its parts, for the composite is a third thing, not  
something added, but resulting, inasmuch as it is the very matter and form, as undivided.

### 3.

175 The third principal argument is this. [ $\alpha$ ] That which is nothing other than an inherence is not  
divided from what it inheres in; instead, it makes one thing with what it inheres in, through  
their lack of division. But [ $\beta$ ] an accident is of this sort. Therefore etc. The major [ $\alpha$ ] is clear,  
because it is impossible to conceive of inherence without that which bounds (*termino*) the  
inherence, which is the subject itself of the accident. I prove the minor [ $\beta$ ], because  
180 inherence is not added (*venit ad*) to an accident – just like a point to a line.

Many make a great difficulty here over whether inherence is the essence of an  
accident. I reply that inherence is the accident itself, and I prove this, because [ $\beta$ 1] it is  
185 certain that it is not some other absolute thing. Therefore, if it is something other [than the  
accident], it is either a relation or something relative (*respectus*) from one of the other six  
genera.<sup>18</sup> It is not a relation, because then for an accident to inhere would be nothing other  
than for it to be referred to another and for the subject to receive would be its being referred  
to another.<sup>19</sup> And since an accident, by inhering, yields being such (*esse tale*), every *being such*  
will be a *being related*.

[ $\beta$ 2] Second, the fourth species of quality<sup>20</sup> is no more essentially inherence than are  
190 other accidents – for otherwise it would be more essentially an accident than are other  
accidents. But qualities of the fourth species are inherence itself. For instance, shape is  
nothing other than inherence, since it is nothing other than the adjacency of parts. Thus if it  
were permissible to [so] speak, an accident is more a kind of adjacency than an accident.<sup>21</sup>  
Thus the author of the *Book of Six Principles*, in assigning the character (*rationem*) of six  
categories, says that the character of these consists in adjacency. So too, in a certain old  
195 comment on *Physics* 2, the Commentator says that whiteness is not, but rather white.

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<sup>18</sup> That is, either the inherence will be in the category of relation, or in one of the remaining six category that are in some way relative – that is, in one of the accidental categories beyond quantity and quality, either *where*, *when*, *action*, *passion*, *position*, or *having*.

<sup>19</sup> Supplying *esset referrri* (Capreolus).

<sup>20</sup> “A fourth kind of quality is shape and the external form of each thing, and in addition straightness and curvedness and anything like these” (*Cat.* 10a11-12).

<sup>21</sup> I take the point to be that *accidens*, with its overtones of one thing’s falling upon another, is a misleading term, and that it would be better to speak in terms of adjacency.

[β3] Confirmation: If the formal<sup>22</sup> being of an accident is to be the accidental form of something (*est accidere*), just as the formal being of whiteness is to make white, [then] since whiteness is nothing other than pure whitening,<sup>23</sup> an accident will be nothing other than pure inherence.<sup>24</sup> Therefore inherence does not *belong to* the essence of an accident. Instead, [the accident] is precisely the inherence itself, and the inherence is the very essence of the accident.

On the contrary, an accident remains when the inherence does not. Therefore an accident is not the inherence itself, as you say.<sup>25</sup> Reply: the inherence of an accident in a subject is not the reality of the substance, nor the reality of the accident, since both the substance and the accident imply (*dicunt*) positive realities, whereas inherence implies some kind of privation, since it implies a lack of division on the part of both in some third thing – namely, in formal effect. Therefore inherence does not add any positive reality, but a negation, and God removes that when he separates an accident from its subject. So just as the reality of a point is not its lack of division, but instead it is a thing (*res*) grounding (*fundans*) its lack of division with a line, so too for an accident in the present case. But more about this in the second [question of distinction 12].

#### 4.

The fourth argument is a fortiori (*a maiori*), as follows. If some accident were a bounded reality, this would be true above all of quantity. But quantity is not a divided thing but is an undivided thing,<sup>26</sup> making one undivided thing per se not through aggregation and an intermediary relation (*respectus*), but through lack of division. Therefore. The major premise is clear. For some say that quantity is the same as substance on account of its {111a} affinity (*convenientiam*) with substance. Thus quantity alone is posited as separate in the sacrament of the altar, because it seems to be more of a separable being than the other accidents.

I prove the minor of the argument, that quantity is not some bounded and divided thing, as follows. Take a piece of wood. It is true to say that it is susceptible to partition (*partibile*) through quantity. I then ask whether it is susceptible to partition through quantity<sup>27</sup> because [i] quantity deposits (*relinquit*) some mode in the substance, a mode<sup>28</sup> that is its being susceptible to partition, or because [ii] the quantity just is the substance's parts' being subject to partition. Not the first, because then I could conceive of a substance susceptible to partition without quantity, and God could make that substance subject to the deposited mode, without making it subject to quantity, as the other opinion imagines. Likewise, its causality will then be the causality of something efficient, not of form. Therefore one must accept the second way [ii], that the quantity just is the parts' being susceptible to partition. I imagine this as follows: that when I speak of a part I am speaking of two things – namely, the substance itself with its matter, and its susceptibility to partition – and these are not one and the same, just as in a part of flesh its fleshhood and its being susceptible to partition are not the same. Thus, the term 'part' is compounded out of [a] that which is the part

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<sup>22</sup> Reading *formale* (Toulouse) for *formaliter* (Rome).

<sup>23</sup> Reading *dealbatio* (Toulouse) for *albedo* (Rome); *albere* (Capreolus).

<sup>24</sup> Reading *inhaerentia* for the well-attested but seemingly nonsensical *accidentia* (Rome, Toulouse, Capreolus).

<sup>25</sup> Reading *dicis* for *dicitur*.

<sup>26</sup> Supplying *sed est res indivisa* (Toulouse); om. Capreolus.

<sup>27</sup> Supplying *quaero tunc utrum sit partibile per quantitatem* (Toulouse), for *aut* (Rome; Capreolus).

<sup>28</sup> Reading *qui* (Toulouse) for *quae* (Rome, Capreolus).

235 denominatively, and [b] its formal susceptibility to partition, in such a way that every part of  
the wood can be resolved into two things: its woodenness and its susceptibility to partition.  
Once this is seen, the minor premise becomes clear. For I say that this susceptibility to  
partition is not added to (*advenit*) that wood through a mediating relation, as if susceptibility  
to partition were added to those parts by way of some union. For then the substratum would  
240 have to be something divisible, and it would have multiple parts<sup>29</sup> beneath its susceptibility to  
partition, which is quantity and its very susceptibility to partition. Beyond this, however,  
there would be something deposited by the quantity in the woodenness, and so the causality  
of the form would be the causality of something efficient. Otherwise, it is that very quantity,  
and we ought to have stopped at the first.

245 I confirm this, because otherwise it could not be avoided that multiple dimensions  
would exist together. For since dimension immediately follows parts, and according to you  
the parts of the wood are divided from the parts of the quantity, there would necessarily be  
different dimensions of the wood and of the quantity.

250 Thus I conceive that just as a straight line implies (*dicit*) one thing accidentally, by the  
single lack of division grounded in the line and the straightness, so the woodenness and its  
susceptibility to partition in the part of a line imply (*dicunt*) one thing by lack of division in  
every way, so that being susceptible to partition is not something deposited by the quantity  
in the wood, but is the lack of division of that quantity (which is its very susceptibility to  
partition) and of that wood. Thus in the same composite where there are many quanta  
255 through quantity (as in a human being the substance is a quantum, as are those qualities and  
other accidents that are extended) there is only one quantity – something that would not be  
the case if quantity were not susceptibility to partition. For if that which underlies  
(*substernitur*) quantity were to have multiple parts serving as the substrate corresponding to  
the parts of quantity, then since divided realities in this way would have distinct parts, they  
260 would have distinct susceptibilities to partition, because when a formal effect is multiplied,  
the formal nature (*ratio*) of that effect is multiplied, and then it would necessarily have  
distinct dimensions. But by maintaining that this susceptibility to partition is quantity itself,  
undivided from the nature grounding the susceptibility to partition, it then clearly appears  
how there need be only<sup>30</sup> one quantity in a single<sup>31</sup> accidental whole, because multiple  
265 realities<sup>32</sup> can in this way be undivided in one susceptibility to partition.

On the basis of this conception, some have supposed that quantity is really the same  
as substance, which is easily disproved by the nature of their union. For while the substance  
remains unchanged, it is changed now into {111b} one quantity and now into another. But  
although they really differ, they do not differ as two divided realities, however much united,  
270 but they enter into the unity of a single lack of division.

## 5.

275 The fifth argument is a *reductio ad impossibile*. For if an accident is a bounded reality divided  
from its substance, then many absurdities follow, and especially these three: *first*, that in a  
snub nose there will be many snubnesses and in a square line many squares; *second*, that every  
accident is one body per se; *third*, that many dimensions and many bodies will exist together.

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<sup>29</sup> Reading *partem et partem* (Toulouse) for *partem* (Rome).

<sup>30</sup> Reading *nisi* (Toulouse) for *ubi* (Rome).

<sup>31</sup> Reading *uno* (Toulouse) for *unio* (Rome).

<sup>32</sup> Reading *realitates* (Toulouse) for *totalitates* (Rome).

The *first* is clear, because since snubness is the shape of a nose, it is nothing other than a kind of lack of division among the parts of the nose. Therefore, for however many parts there are in the nose, there will be that many snubnesses, which will not be one except by a relation. But according to you there is whiteness in the nose, which according to you is a bounded reality. Likewise,<sup>33</sup> there are many accidents that according to you are one through union. Therefore the lack of division among the parts of those accidents are one through the union of relation rather than through lack of division. Therefore there will be many snubnesses there, which will be one through aggregation rather than through lack of division.<sup>34</sup> For from the fact that every accident<sup>35</sup> in the nose<sup>36</sup> is a thing that is bounded, and likewise for the substance of that nose, [it follows that] their parts will be distinct. As a result, their lack of division will be multiple shapes,<sup>37</sup> and thus finally their snubness will be multiple.

You will say that there is one snubness because there is one shaping (*figuratio*) and a single lack of division among the parts of the subject and the accidents. I argue against this, because it is impossible for a modification to be one undivided thing unless the things modified are one undivided thing. But according to you the substance of the nose and each of its accidents is one thing divided and bounded. Therefore.

I show the *second* absurdity as follows. If a body is that which has length, height, and depth, then distinct<sup>38</sup> breadths, depths, and heights are distinct bodies. But according to you here, distinct breadths, depths, and heights are grounded in the various distinct parts of the subject and the other accidents, which according to you are divided things, each bounded in itself. Nor do those multiple breadths, depths, and heights arrive without division at a single breadth, depth, and height, but only through a relational union. Therefore.

The *third* absurdity – [that many dimensions and many bodies will exist together] – is clear through the same means, because the antecedent was the subject.

### [Conclusion]

So I say, then, that an accident is distinct from its substance. For change (*transmutatio*) above all else makes one know the distinctness of realities. But a substance is changed from accident to accident. Therefore.

I say secondly, however, that it is distinct only as it grounds with it an intimate lack of division. For it comes with the substance not through an intermediary relation but through a relational lack of division, which is said to be relational inasmuch as it has *relata* (*extrema*). But that lack of division is the very composition of the accident with the substance, and it can be removed by divine power. An apt example for this is the parts of a continuous piece of wood, which are added to each other not through a union and an intermediary<sup>39</sup> relation, but through a relational, mutual unity and lack of division.

### [Reply to the Initial Argument]

To the argument for the opposite, I grant that being is predicated of an accident *in recto* and

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<sup>33</sup> Reading *Similiter* (Toulouse, Capreolus) for *Simpliciter* (Rome).

<sup>34</sup> Reading *indivisionem* (Capreolus) for *unionem* (Rome, Toulouse).

<sup>35</sup> om. *est* (Toulouse; Capreolus).

<sup>36</sup> om. *et* (Toulouse; Capreolus).

<sup>37</sup> om. *per consequens* (Capreolus); Toulouse erroneously omits whole phrase.

<sup>38</sup> Reading *diversus* (Toulouse, Capreolus) for *in* (Rome).

<sup>39</sup> Reading *mediam* (Toulouse) for *mutuam* (Rome).



320 per se. But I draw a distinction concerning ‘per se,’ since this can be taken in the first or the third mode.<sup>40</sup> Then although an accident is a being per se in the first mode, it is not a being per se in the third mode. Universally, no thing is a being per se in the third mode that does not enter into the constitution of the third, unless through a relational lack of division, because ‘per se in the third mode’ denotes an entity that is divided and bounded. In contrast, ‘per se in the first mode’ does not denote this, but denotes only that which inheres per se in such a way that it inheres in it by nature of the subject and by nothing else.

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<sup>40</sup> See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.4, 73a35-b24.