Topic III: Sexual Morality
Lecture 13I. Seven Useful Techniques for Discussing Sexual Morality - Continued
Technique 4: The Appeal to General Moral Principles Not Restricted to Sexual Behavior
The basic idea here is that, in so far as possible, one should prefer to have very general moral principles, rather than ones that are restricted to behavior of a limited sort. But if this is right, then one should try to support moral claims in the area of specifically sexual behavior by claims that apply to both sexual behavior and non-sexual behavior.
Illustration: The Recreational View of Sex
In the case of a recreational view of sex, one might appeal to the very general claim that, other things being equal, the enjoyment of pleasure is a good thing, or that it is something that increases human happiness, and that the latter is a good thing, etc. This general principle would then create a presumption in favor of the conclusion that sexual activity is desirable in itself. Someone might, of course, agree with the general principle, but go on to argue that other things are not equal in this case. But then the discussion has at least gotten started, and moreover, the person who objects to sexual activity in certain circumstances, or to certain types of sexual activities, now has the burden of proof falling on his or her side: it is his or her task to show that there are negative factors that outweigh the positive consideration in question.
Technique 5: The Appeal to Other Areas of Human Behavior
This technique, like the preceding, focuses upon the desirability of general principles. The thrust is as follows. Suppose that someone advances a moral principle, M, that deals with behavior in some special area S. The strategy is to consider principles that are analogous to principle M, but which apply to areas other than S. If it turns out that principles that are analogous to M, but which apply to other areas, are implausible, then the question arises as to why this is so, and the suggestion is that if one cannot offer a convincing explanation as to why principle M, which applies in area S, is plausible, whereas some principle M*, which applies to some other area, S*, is not plausible, then one should abandon principle M as unsound.
Why does this technique also rest upon the idea that general moral principles are desirable? Essentially because if one could find a principle M* that was analogous to M, but which applied to some other area S*, and which was also plausible, then it would seem that there should be some more general principle that focuses upon the feature or features in virtue of which M and M* are analogous, and that thereby explains why both M and M* are plausible principles.
Illustration
Suppose that someone says that Lesbian sex is morally wrong. One can ask why sex between women is different than tennis between women, or conversation between women, and so on. Why is it that it is morally okay for women to do various things together, but not to have sex with one another?
The basic thrust here is that unless one can say why sex between women is wrong, while tennis and conversations are not, then one is appealing to moral principles that place restrictions upon sexual behavior, where the principles are not instances of more general principles that apply to behavior in general - non-sexual behavior as well as sexual behavior.
Technique 6: The Consequences of Actions
One way of arguing for a general position is by arguing that certain types of sexual activities, or sexual activities under various circumstances, will have certain consequences, either direct or indirect. This is one way in which people who favor a traditional sexual morality, for example, may support their views. Thus they may appeal, for example, to such short-term consequences as: (1) The spread of sexually transmitted diseases; (2) Unwanted pregnancies that often lead either to abortions or to the birth of children that will not have a good environment in which to grow up, due to poverty, etc. Alternatively, advocates of a traditional sexual morality may appeal to long-term consequences, arguing that people who are promiscuous before marriage are likely to acquire the habit of promiscuous behavior, and then find it very difficult to be faithful after they are married. So the result will be infidelity, the breakdown of marriages, with all of the associated unhappiness, plus an unstable environment for children. (Compare Peter Bertocci's line of argument.)
Technique 7: The Appeal to the Consequences of Adopting Various Moral Rules
Illustrations:
(1) People may be sexually mature for a long while before they get married. To ask people to refrain from all sexual activity is thus to ask them to make a considerable sacrifice. The attempt to avoid absolutely all sexual activity, moreover, may be very difficult, and the struggle to do so may take time and energy away from many worthwhile activities.
(2) Some views would also have the consequence that homosexuals would never be justified in engaging in sexual activities, and while this would affect fewer people than the prohibition against pre-marital sex, those affected would, if they conformed to the morality in question, be making a life-long sacrifice.
II. Critical Thinking And Sexual Morality: An Extended Illustration
We have now seen a number
of techniques that one can employ to think more effectively about
general
sexual views. Let us now consider the application of these
techniques
to one especially important position - the reproductive or procreative
view. How might one argue in support of this type of view, and
what
objections might be offered in response?
The claim that sexual activity is morally acceptable only if the goal
(or the main goal) is reproduction might either be defended by means of
an argument to show that sexual activity of which the (main) goal was
not
reproduction was intrinsically wrong, or by an argument to show
that sexual activity of which the (main) goal was not reproduction was
likely to have undesirable consequences. So let us
consider
each of those possibilities in turn
IIA. Is Non-Reproductively Oriented Sex Intrinsically Wrong?
How might the claim that non-reproductively oriented sex is intrinsically wrong be supported? Discussions of certain possible lines of argument in the previous lecture suggest that it is not easy to see how this can be argued unless one appeals to religion. Recall, for example, the appeal to the claim that the purpose of sexual activity is reproduction. As emerged there, this claim cannot be interpreted either simply as a claim about how sexual activity can be used, or simply as a claim about the evolutionary explanation of the development of sexual reproduction, as opposed to asexual reproduction. For neither of the latter claims give one any reason for concluding that there is anything intrinsically wrong in using sexual parts of the body in other ways than as a means of reproducing.
Are things different if one brings God into it, and claims that God provided us with sexual equipment in order that we would be able to reproduce, so that we could be fruitful and multiply? The answer would seem to be that even that is not enough, by itself, to generate a satisfactory argument. For the fact that God has given us the means of achieving a certain end - reproducing - does not itself entail that he will be unhappy if we discover other ends that can be achieved using the same equipment. So one has to claim, as well, that God does not want us to use our erogenous zones in other ways. But why should that be? For it is not as if engaging in sexual activities that are not geared to reproduction makes it impossible for the human race to produce a sufficient number of children. So what is wrong with also engaging in activities whose aim is simply to increase human happiness? It is not easy to see any plausible line of argument here, and I think that at this point the person who bring God into the argument is forced to appeal to divine revelation: God has told us that sex that is not aimed at reproduction is forbidden. But such an appeal to sheer revelation is not very appealing when it comes to morality, and it is no accident, I think, that the Catholic church, for example, has traditionally maintained that the sexual morality that it embraces can be justified by arguments that do not make any appeal to revelation.
IIB. Are there Good Consequentialist Arguments Against Non-Reproductively Oriented Sexual Activity?
The main consequentialist argument in the area of sexual morality is the one discussed above in connection with Technique 6. What that argument supports, however, is not the view that sexual activity that is not reproductively oriented is wrong, but the idea that it is best if there is no sex outside of marriage. So while it supports part of a traditional view, it provides no support for the part that we are considering here. As far as that earlier consequentialist argument goes - with its appeal to sexually transmitted diseases, teenage pregnancies, and the breakdown of marriages - there is nothing wrong with married couples enjoying sexual activity for whatever reason they have in mind.
IIC. Arguments Against the Reproductive View of Sexual Activity?
The main considerations here were mentioned in the previous lecture. First, there are certain counterexamples:
(1) A married couple who are no longer physically able to have children;
(2) A married couple who have many children, and who are economically incapable of raising any more.
Secondly, there is an appeal to the improvement in the lives of people if more people are able to engage in sexual activities:
Sexual activity is generally rather enjoyable, so, other things being equal, people will be happier because of the addition of something positive to their lives.
Finally, there is an
appeal to the negative impact upon people of their not being allowed to
engage in sexual activity:
The non-satisfaction of sexual desires often leads to frustration, and, in addition, a good deal of energy may be spent in resisting one's sexual desires. So an absence of sexual activity means not only that there is less pleasure in one's life: it also means that one's life involves more frustration and wasted activity.