As a researcher, I specialize in metaethics and ethical theory. In my dissertation, Moral Obligation, Evidence, and Belief, I argue that if we pay careful attention to the nature of the concept obligation and the way we use the phrase "moral obligation," we will see that there are good reasons for rejecting objectivism about moral obligation, the view that our moral obligations do not depend on our beliefs or our evidence, in favor of subjectivism about moral obligation, the view that our moral obligations depend on our beliefs. It follows that an agent has violated (or, at least, failed to meet) one of his or her moral obligations if and only if he or she has done something blameworthy. It also follows that consequentialists and deontologists do not (or, at least, should not) disagree about what agents are morally obligated to do so much as what it would be best for agents to do.

I recently reviewed Michael J. Zimmerman's book Ignorance and Moral Obligation for the Journal of Moral Philosophy. You can find that review here. You can get a feel for my other work by reading the essays I have written for 1000-Word Philosophy. The first of those is on moral luck and can be found here. The second is on the repugnant conclusion and can be found here.

In addition to my interests in metaethics and ethical theory, I also have interests in practical ethics, philosophy of law, philosophy of religion, and epistemology.