(1) "Counterparts, Logic and Metaphysics: Reply to Ramachandran," Analysis 50 (1990) 167-173.
(2) "The Indispensability of Sinn," The Philosophical Review 99 (1990) 535-63; reprinted in On Sense and Direct Reference: A Reader in Philosophy of Language, Matthew Davidson (ed.). McGraw-Hill, 2007, 57090.
(3) "Worlds and States of Affairs: How Fine-Grained Can They Be?," in Language, Truth and Ontology edited by Kevin Mulligan, Kluwer 1992, 118-132.
(4) "Melia on Modalism," Philosophical Studies 68 (1992) 57-63 (a response to a discussion of Part I of my book Languages of Possibility).
(5) "Solving the Iteration Problem," Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (1993) 311-330.
(6) "Reply to Marks," Philosophical Studies 69 (1993) 281-295.
(7) "Time, Events and Modality," in The Philosophy of Time edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (1993) 80-95. Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series, OUP.
(8) "A New Riddle of Existence," Philosophical Perspectives 8, edited by James Tomberlin, Ridgeview 1993, 415-430.
(9) "But a Was Arbitrary," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993) 21-34.
(10) "Donnellan on a Puzzle about Belief," Philosophical Studies 73 (1994) 169-180.
(11) "Comparatives in Counterpart Theory," Analysis 54 (1994) 37-42.
(12) "Realism and Scepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995) 205-222. Reprinted in Scepticism: A Contemporary Reader, edited by Keith DeRose and Edward Warfield, Oxford University Press 1998.