As a researcher, I specialize in metaethics and ethical theory. In my dissertation, Moral Obligation, Evidence, and Belief, I argue that if we pay careful attention to the nature of the concept obligation and the way we use the phrase "moral obligation," we will see that there are good reasons for rejecting objectivism about moral obligation, the view that our moral obligations do not depend on our beliefs or our evidence, in favor of subjectivism about moral obligation, the view that our moral obligations depend on our beliefs. It follows that an agent has violated (or, at least, failed to meet) one of his or her moral obligations if and only if he or she has done something blameworthy. It also follows that consequentialists and deontologists do not (or, at least, should not) disagree about what agents are morally obligated to do so much as what it would be best for agents to do.

Book Review

While working on my dissertation, I reviewed Michael J. Zimmerman's book Ignorance and Moral Obligation for the Journal of Moral Philosophy. You can read the submitted version of that review here and the published version here.

1000-Word Philosophy

I have written two essays for 1000-Word Philosophy. You can find those at the links provided below.

Work in Progress

I am currently working on a number of papers in which I argue either against objectivism about moral obligation or for subjectivism about moral obligation.

"The Moral 'Ought' and Moral Obligation"

"Moral Obligation and Punishment"

"In Defense of Subjectivism about Moral Obligation"